

1 Department of Labor and Industry  
2 Board of Personnel Appeals  
3 PO Box 6518  
4 Helena, MT 59604-6518  
5 (406) 444-2718  
6  
7

8 STATE OF MONTANA  
9 BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

10 IN THE MATTER OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE NO. 6-2009

13 LAUREL UNIFIED EDUCATION	)	
14 ASSOCIATION, MEA-MFT,	)	
15 Complainant,	)	INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
16 -vs-	)	AND
17	)	FINDING OF PROBABLE MERIT
18 YELLOWSTONE COUNTY SCHOOL	)	
19 DISTRICT NOS. 7&70,	)	
20 Defendant.	)	
21	)	

22 \*\*\*\*\*

23  
24 **I. Introduction**

25  
26 On September 29, 2008, the Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT, hereafter  
27 the Association, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board of Personnel  
28 Appeals, hereafter BOPA or Board, alleging that Yellowstone County School District,  
29 hereafter the District, bargained in bad faith by refusing to meet and negotiate with  
30 respect to mandatory bargaining subjects thereby ignoring the impact of unilateral  
31 changes on the bargaining unit. Violations of 39-31-305(1) (2), 39-31-401 (5) MCA are  
32 alleged. Pursuant to an agreed upon time extension, the District answered the charge  
33 on October 24, 2008, and denied that any unfair labor practice had been committed.  
34 The Association filed its last argument with the investigator on November 11, 2008. The  
35 Association is represented in this matter by Vicki McDonald, attorney at law, and the  
36 District is represented by Jeff Weldon, attorney at law.  
37

38  
39 John Andrew was assigned by the Board to investigate the charge and has reviewed  
40 the information submitted by the parties and communicated with them as necessary in  
41 the course of the investigation. There is a similar charge involving the same parties  
42 also filed with the BOPA – ULP 8-2009. In that case the District has moved to  
43 consolidate the two unfair labor practice complaints. The Association has opposed that  
44 motion. For purposes of this decision the investigator denies the request for reasons  
45 more fully explained in ULP 8-2009.  
46

47  
48 **II. Background and Discussion**

49  
50 The basis for this charge is found in schedule changes made at the Fred W. Graff

1 School, hereafter Graff. Prior to 2007 Graff taught students in grades K-4. In the fall of  
2 2007 the school changed to teach students in 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> grade only. Certified staff at  
3 Graff, as well as the remainder of the high school and elementary certified staff, are  
4 covered by a collective bargaining agreement between Yellowstone County School  
5 District No. 7 and 7-70 and the Laurel Unified Education Association – Certified Unit.  
6 The most recent agreement became effective July 1, 2008, and runs through June 30,  
7 2011. The current agreement was signed on April 14, 2008.

8  
9 In the spring of 2008, the Association became aware that the District was considering  
10 schedule changes at Graff. On May 29, 2008, Brent Scott, President of the Certified  
11 Association, wrote to Superintendent Josh Middleton and Andrea Fischer, Graff  
12 Principal and Director of Curriculum, expressing the concerns of the Association over  
13 any possible schedule changes. Mr. Scott acknowledged the right of management to  
14 make unilateral changes in teacher schedules, but he retained the right of the  
15 Association to bargain the impact of such changes on teacher working conditions. His  
16 letter provides notice that:

17  
18 “ . . . if the scheduled changes are implemented, the Association will demand to  
19 bargain over those changes.”  
20

21 On May 30, 2008, in a letter copied to Ms. Fisher, Mike Longbottom, Trustee Chair, and  
22 Linda Filpula, Laurel Middle School Principal, Superintendent Middleton, responded to  
23 Mr. Scott’s request, as well as to an earlier non-related letter from Mr. Scott.  
24 Concerning schedule related issues Superintendent Middleton responded:

25  
26 “This letter to you is my acknowledgement of your correspondence and notice to  
27 you that I have no intention of responding to either.”  
28

29 Since school was out for the summer, there were apparently no actual changes in  
30 schedule for the 2007 school year. However, when school convened in the fall of 2008  
31 schedule changes were in place. These changes apparently were discussed between  
32 Mr. Scott and Superintendent Middleton on September 3, 2008, but there was no  
33 resolution at that time.  
34

35 On September 5, 2008, Brent Scott again wrote to Superintendent Middleton. Mr.  
36 Scott’s letter in part states:

37  
38 “As the Association still feels strongly that the schedule was changed unilaterally  
39 and that the impact on teachers is significant, adding up to over two additional  
40 weeks of teaching time over a year and an equal reduction in preparation time,  
41 **the Association, by this letter, demands to bargain with the District over the**  
42 **unilateral changes in the Graff schedule.**” (Mr. Scott’s emphasis)  
43

44 On September 12, 2008, in a letter copied to Board Chair Longbottom and Jeff Weldon,  
45 District Counsel, Superintendent Middleton responded to Mr. Scott advising that the  
46 District would not change the current schedule at Graff as the schedule is important for  
47 the education of the students and,  
48

49 “The schedule fits within the terms of the CBA. Since this is not a unilateral  
50 change in working conditions, the district does not believe it has an obligation to  
bargain.”

1 The Board of Personnel Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under Sections 39-31-  
2 103 and 39-31-405, MCA. The Montana Supreme Court has approved the practice of  
3 the Board of Personnel Appeals in using Federal Court and National Labor Relations  
4 Board (NLRB) precedent as guidelines in interpreting the Montana Collective Bargaining  
5 for Public Employees Act, State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals vs. District Court,  
6 183 Montana 223 598 P.2d 1117, 103 LRRM 2297; Teamsters Local No. 45 vs. State  
7 ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals, 185 Montana 272, 635 P.2d 185, 119 LRRM 2682;  
8 and AFSCME Local No. 2390 vs. City of Billings, Montana 555 P.2d 507, 93 LRRM  
9 2753. To the extent cited in this decision, federal precedent is considered applicable.

10  
11 It is well settled on the federal level that a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of  
12 bargaining is an unfair labor practice and a per se failure to bargain in good faith, NLRB  
13 v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 50 LRRM 2177, (1962).

14  
15 The rationale used in Katz has been adopted by the Board of Personnel Appeals in  
16 numerous cases and remains good law. Absent impasse unilateral changes cannot be  
17 made in mandatory subjects of bargaining. Moreover, the burden of showing that  
18 impasse has been reached is on the employer. Here the question of impasse is not an  
19 issue so this is not a matter of implementation based on impasse, nor is this a case  
20 where conduct of the Association necessitated implementation by the District. See, for  
21 example, Serramonte Oldsmobile, 318 NLRB 80, 151 LRRM 1373, 86 F.2d 227 (D.C.  
22 Cir 1996). In the instant case, the Association has acknowledged the ability of the  
23 District to make unilateral changes to teacher schedules and the Association has not  
24 engaged in tactics to alter that ability. Rather, the Association has insisted on its ability  
25 to negotiate the impact of those changes. Thus, the issues are, (1) whether  
26 management had the right to implement the changes without bargaining their impact, or  
27 (2) if management did not have that right, whether exigent circumstances necessitated  
28 the changes without the need to bargain the impact of the changes.

29  
30 A unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining is unlawful if the change is  
31 "material, substantial and significant". Litton Microwave Cooking Products, 136 LRRM  
32 1163 (1990), Peerless Food Products, 236 NLRB 161, 98 LRRM 36 (1978), Alamo  
33 Cement Co., 281 NLRB 737, 123 LRRM 1161 (1986). The BOPA also recognized this  
34 in ULP 6-97 - Browning Federation of Teachers Local 2447 v. Browning Public Schools,  
35 Roger Helmer, Superintendent, ULP 6-97, September 1997. In the case before the  
36 investigator there is evidence that the changes did adversely impact the working  
37 conditions of the teachers in a material, substantial and significant fashion as the  
38 changes did reduce prep time and arguably resulted in additional work time. As found  
39 in an analogous case, Glasgow Education Association v Glasgow Board of Trustees,  
40 ULP 13-2006,

41  
42  
43 Prep time is the performance of duties involved in teaching, rather than break  
44 time. Reducing the amount of prep time during the work day for high school  
45 teachers does not reduce the amount of prep work necessary for teaching. By  
46 assigning the high school teachers to study hall supervision instead of a second  
47 prep period, the District effectively increased the amount of work it required from  
48 the high school teachers—the teachers still had the same amount of prep work to  
49 do, plus supervision of a study hall. On its face, requiring additional work is a  
50

1 condition of employment and a subject of bargaining. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-  
2 305(2).  
3

4 Relating to the ability of management to unilaterally implement changes in mandatory  
5 subjects of bargaining is the question of whether contract language and bargaining  
6 history reflect a waiver of the right to bargain over management changes. As previously  
7 mentioned, the Association clearly expressed its concerns about possible schedule  
8 changes and their impact on teachers. The Association also clearly demanded to  
9 bargain the impact of these changes in a timely manner. The District denied that  
10 request and during the course of the investigation it has now clarified that part of the  
11 rationale was contract language, including the management rights portion and  
12 integration or zipper clause in the collective bargaining agreement. In addition to  
13 relevant citations provided by the Association addressing waiver, in Bozeman Education  
14 Association v. Gallatin County School District No. 7, ULP 43-79 – Affirmed 18<sup>th</sup> Judicial  
15 District, September 1985, the Board of Personnel Appeals affirmed a hearing examiner  
16 decision providing:  
17

18 Once it is established that the matter in question is one on which the parties are  
19 required to bargain in good faith; unilateral changes cannot be made in either  
20 those conditions of employment, wages hours and fringe benefits to which the  
21 contract speaks or in those areas even if they are not contained in the contract;  
22 unless, of course, there exists a waiver by the party to whom the duty to bargain  
23 is owed. In the instant case there is no evidence that such a waiver, either  
24 express or implied, by Defendant prior to making the change in evaluation  
25 procedures. The signing of a collective bargaining agreement does not relieve  
26 the parties of the continuing obligation to negotiate prior to making changes in  
27 mandatory subjects.  
28

29 In the case before the investigator there is no clear and unmistakable showing by the  
30 District that the Association ever waived its right to bargain either in action, inaction, or  
31 in the words of the collective bargaining agreement when read in its totality. Also see  
32 NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332, 334.  
33

34 Turning to the question of exigent circumstance - budgetary and/or statutory  
35 consideration in the instant case - as with impasse, the burden of proving exigent  
36 circumstance rests with the employer and any claim for such an exception to impasse  
37 should be viewed narrowly with the weight on the employer to show that such a  
38 circumstance was caused by external events, beyond the control of the employer and  
39 not reasonably foreseeable, RBE Electronics of S.D., 320 NLRB 80, 151 LRRM 1329,  
40 (1995). The statute cited by the District provides:  
41

42 **20-1-301. School fiscal year.** (1) The school fiscal year begins on July 1 and  
43 ends on June 30. At least the minimum aggregate hours defined in subsection  
44 (2) must be conducted during each school fiscal year, except that 1,050  
45 aggregate hours of pupil instruction for graduating seniors may be sufficient or a  
46 minimum of 360 aggregate hours of pupil instruction must be conducted for a  
47 kindergarten program, as provided in 20-7-117.

48 (2) The minimum aggregate hours required by grade are:

49 (a) 720 hours for grades 1 through 3; and

50 (b) 1,080 hours for grades 4 through 12.

1 (3) For any elementary or high school district that fails to provide for at least  
2 the minimum aggregate hours, as listed in subsections (1) and (2), the  
3 superintendent of public instruction shall reduce the direct state aid for the district  
4 for that school year by two times an hourly rate, as calculated by the office of  
5 public instruction, for the aggregate hours missed.  
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
7 Part of the argument of the District centers around this statute and the need to comply  
8 with it from a legal standpoint as well as from the standpoint that non-compliance would  
9 lead to the loss of funding. To be certain both are reasonable considerations.  
10 However, as pointed out by the Association, this statute has been in force for some time  
11 and addressing its requirements was certainly foreseeable. Moreover, it was not until  
12 such time as a formal charge was filed that the statute became an issue. Both are valid  
13 points made by the Association and thus make the argument of exigent circumstance  
14 less than convincing. The burden of demonstrating an exception to the requirement to  
15 bargain over mandatory issues has not been met. In that regard this case before the  
16 investigator bears striking similarity to ULP 5-2007, Elder Grove Education Association  
17 v Elder Grove Elementary School District wherein a similar argument made by the  
18 employer was found insufficient reason to ignore the requirement to bargain.  
19

### 20 **III. Finding of Probable Merit**

21  
22 The role of the investigator is to determine whether there is probable merit to the  
23 alleged unfair labor practice charge. There is substantial evidence and convincing  
24 argument made by the Association to support the charge that an unfair labor practice  
25 was committed. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 39-31-405, MCA, probable merit to  
26 the charge is found, and the Board will be issuing a notice of hearing.  
27

28 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2008.  
29

30  
31 BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS  
32

33  
34 By:   
35 \_\_\_\_\_  
36 John Andrew  
37 Investigator  
38  
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43

### 44 NOTICE

45  
46 ARM 24.26.680B (6) provides: As provided for in 39-31-405 (4), MCA, if a  
47 finding of probable merit is made, the person or entity against whom the charge is filed  
48 shall file an answer to the complaint. The answer shall be filed within ten (10) days with  
49 the Investigator at PO Box 6518, Helena MT 59604-6518.  
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Windy Krutson, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed to the following on the 24th day of December, 2008, postage paid and addressed as follows:

VICKI MCDONALD  
MCDONALD LAW FIRM  
2422 APPLEWOOD AVENUE  
BILLINGS MT 59102

JEFFREY WELDON  
ATTORNEY AT LAW  
PO BOX 2558  
BILLINGS MT 59103 2558

STEVE HENRY  
MEA MFT  
510 NORTH 29<sup>TH</sup> STREET  
BILLINGS MT 59101

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8 STATE OF MONTANA  
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13 LAUREL UNIFIED EDUCATION	)	
14 ASSOCIATION, MEA-MFT,	)	
15 Complainant,	)	INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
16 -vs-	)	AND
17	)	FINDING OF PROBABLE MERIT
18 YELLOWSTONE COUNTY SCHOOL	)	
19 DISTRICT NOS. 7&70,	)	
20 Defendant.	)	
21	)	

22 \* \* \* \* \*

23  
24 **I. Introduction**

25  
26 On October 16, 2008, the Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT, hereafter  
27 the Association, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board of Personnel  
28 Appeals alleging that the Yellowstone County School District, hereafter the District,  
29 bargained in bad faith by refusing to meet and negotiate with respect to mandatory  
30 bargaining subjects thereby ignoring the impact of these changes, resulting in an unfair  
31 labor practice. Violations of 39-31-305(1) (2), 39-31-401 (5) MCA are alleged. The  
32 Association is represented in this matter by Vicki McDonald, attorney at law, and the  
33 District is represented by Jeff Weldon, attorney at law.  
34

35  
36 John Andrew was assigned by the Board to investigate the charge and has reviewed  
37 the information submitted by the parties and communicated with them as necessary in  
38 the course of the investigation.  
39

40 **II. Background and Discussion**

41  
42 The summons in this matter was served upon the District on October 22, 2008. The  
43 District did not respond to the charge in the timeframe specified in ARM 24.26.680B(2).  
44 When counsel for the District discovered that a response was due he requested an  
45 extension to reply to the charge. The Association objected to an extension and asked  
46 that a default be entered against the District. The investigator denied the request and  
47 granted an extension for response until November 28, 2008. The District responded at  
48 that time and denied that any unfair labor practice had been committed.  
49  
50

1 The Association continues to maintain its objection to the extension and further requests  
2 that a similar charge involving the same parties, ULP 6-2009, not be consolidated with  
3 ULP 8-2009.  
4

5 To first address the failure by the District to respond to the unfair labor practice charge  
6 summons, ARM 24.26.680B (2) provides:  
7

8 (2) A party so charged shall file a response with the board to the complaint within  
9 10 days.  
10

11 The rule does not specify that a failure to respond in a timely manner requires default,  
12 nor does it rule out that possibility. Rather, as per the summons in this matter  
13

14 "the Board may consider such failure an admission of material facts and waiver  
15 of a hearing".  
16

17 Here there appears to have been a lack of communication between the District and  
18 counsel for the District when ULP 8-2009 was served on the District. This failure did not  
19 amount to wanton or even careless disregard of the charge in any fashion. As soon as  
20 counsel was aware the charge had been served immediate action was taken to rectify  
21 the situation. ARM 24.26.217 (b) clearly allows for an extension upon motion to the  
22 Board and in this case good cause appears to grant such a request. However, the  
23 Association has preserved its right to appeal the decision of the investigator. In that  
24 vein, the two charges will not be consolidated so as to preserve that right independent  
25 of ULP 6-2009. Nonetheless, even though not consolidated there is clear administrative  
26 economy for all involved if these cases proceed forward in close proximity with one  
27 another. For that reason investigative reports on both charges will be issued on the  
28 same date with the possibility that the decision of the investigator be reviewed by a  
29 hearing examiner and at that time the question of consolidation, or at the least  
30 conducting hearings on these cases in close proximity to one another, be revisited if for  
31 no other reason than the parties are the same, many witnesses likely the same, and the  
32 issues similar in nature.  
33

34 The above said, this case concerns an allegation of a unilateral change in a mandatory  
35 subject of bargaining and a refusal on the part of the District to bargain over the change.  
36

37 In the fall of 2008 when teachers at the District's middle school (grades 5-8) returned for  
38 the school year 2008-2009 they returned to a schedule consisting of a start time of 8:20  
39 a.m. and an ending time of 3:42, all within the work day of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.  
40 Upon learning of the change the Association, through its President, Brent Scott, met  
41 with Superintendent Josh Middleton on September 22 and September 29, 2008, to  
42 express concerns over the change and the Association's view that the impact of the  
43 change in schedule was a mandatory subject for bargaining. The Association  
44 formalized its view of the situation in a letter of September 29, 2008, from President  
45 Scott to Superintendent Middleton. In response dated October 2, 2008, the  
46 Superintendent advised that,  
47

48 "Since this issue is not a unilateral change in working conditions, the district does  
49 not believe it has an obligation to bargain."  
50

1 The Board of Personnel Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under Sections 39-31-  
2 103 and 39-31-405, MCA. The Montana Supreme Court has approved the practice of  
3 the Board of Personnel Appeals in using Federal Court and National Labor Relations  
4 Board (NLRB) precedent as guidelines in interpreting the Montana Collective Bargaining  
5 for Public Employees Act, State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals vs. District Court,  
6 183 Montana 223 598 P.2d 1117, 103 LRRM 2297; Teamsters Local No. 45 vs. State  
7 ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals, 185 Montana 272, 635 P.2d 185, 119 LRRM 2682;  
8 and AFSCME Local No. 2390 vs. City of Billings, Montana 555 P.2d 507, 93 LRRM  
9 2753. To the extent cited in this decision, federal precedent is considered when  
10 instructive.

11  
12 The standard adopted by the NLRB for determining whether a change in conditions of  
13 employment must be negotiated is whether the change is "material, substantial and  
14 significant". Litton Microwave Cooking Products, 136 LRRM 1163 (1990), Wabash  
15 Magnetics, Inc., 88 LRRM 1511 (1974) Murphy Diesel Company, 76 LRRM 1469,  
16 (1970) and by the BOPA in ULP 6-97 - Browning Federation of Teachers Local 2447 v  
17 Browning Public Schools, Roger Helmer, Superintendent, ULP 6-97, September 1997.  
18 Here, although there is a disagreement on the extent to which this change in schedule  
19 impacts teachers at the middle school, there clearly is a change that has occurred and it  
20 is arguably substantial, significant and material. To that extent, this change on its face  
21 mandates bargaining.

22  
23 The District argues that language in the contract coupled to some degree with  
24 bargaining history obviate the need to bargain and vest the power to change schedules  
25 without bargaining over either the change or the impact of the change. The Association  
26 argues that the basis of this charge is not found in the collective bargaining agreement  
27 but since that question is raised, the National Labor Relations Board can interpret the  
28 terms of a CBA to decide an unfair labor practice charge. NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp.  
29 (1967), 385 U.S. 421, 430; Like the NLRB the Board of Personnel Appeals can look to  
30 the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether there is an unfair  
31 labor practice claim arising under Montana law. Recognizing this, the investigator has  
32 looked to the terms in the contract and fails to find where the bargaining agreement  
33 demonstrates a clear, unmistakable waiver to bargain on the part of the Association, nor  
34 is there language that supports the refusal to bargain on the part of the District. Without  
35 citing the case law also cited in ULP 6-2009, suffice to say the position of the  
36 Association is well taken. There is merit to ULP 8-2009.


### 37 38 **III. Finding of Probable Merit**

39  
40 The role of the investigator is to determine whether there is probable merit to the  
41 alleged unfair labor practice charge. There is substantial evidence and convincing  
42 argument made by the Association to support the charge that an unfair labor practice  
43 occurred. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 39-31-405, MCA, probable merit to the  
44 charge is found, and the Board will be issuing a notice of hearing.

45  
46 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2008.

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BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS


By:   
John Andrew  
Investigator

NOTICE

ARM 24.26.680B (6) provides: As provided for in 39-31-405 (4), MCA, if a finding of probable merit is made, the person or entity against whom the charge is filed shall file an answer to the complaint. The answer shall be filed within ten (10) days with the Investigator at PO Box 6518, Helena MT 59604-6518.

\*\*\*\*\*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, , do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed to the following on the 24<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2008, postage paid and addressed as follows:

VICKI MCDONALD  
MCDONALD LAW FIRM  
2422 APPLEWOOD AVENUE  
BILLINGS MT 59102

JEFFREY WELDON  
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STEVE HENRY  
MEA MFT  
510 NORTH 29<sup>TH</sup> STREET  
BILLINGS MT 59101



proceeding. In addition, after reviewing the parties' respective arguments regarding the admissibility of Defendant's Exhibits UU and VV, those documents are now admitted into the record. These two documents will, as suggested by the defendant, be sealed, not to be made available for inspection by the public nor disseminated by the parties to any entity not a party to these proceedings except upon order of this tribunal or by any tribunal exercising jurisdiction over this matter.

The parties were given the opportunity to present post-hearing briefs, the last of which were timely received on July 31, 2009 at which time the matter was deemed submitted for decision. Based on the evidence adduced at hearing and the closing briefs of the parties, the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order are made.

## **II. ISSUE**

Did the school district commit an unfair labor practice in requiring the teachers to undertake additional assigned teacher-student contact time without bargaining the impact of that change to impasse?

## **III. FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. The school district operates three schools, two of which, the Graff Elementary School and Laurel Middle School, are of pertinence to this decision. The Graff Elementary School serves third and fourth grade students and the Laurel Middle School serves the school district's fifth through eighth grade students. The school district is a public employer within the meaning of Montana Code Annotated § 39-31-103(10).

2. The Association is a labor organization within the meaning of Montana Code Annotated § 39-31-103(6) and is the exclusive bargaining representative for the certified staff employed at the Graff Elementary School and the Laurel Middle School. The Association and the school district have been parties to collective bargaining agreements going back through 1999. The most recent agreement, reached in 2008, covers the time period between 2008 and 2011.

3. The provisions of the 2008-2011 bargaining agreement (hereinafter 2008-2011 CBA) covers the certified staff employed at the Graff School and the Laurel Middle School. The portions of the agreement which are salient to the contention in this case provide:

### **ARTICLE II - RIGHTS OF THE BOARD**

The Board has, and shall retain, without limitation, all rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it by law.

The Board retains all rights which are not specifically restricted by this agreement.

\* \* \*

## ARTICLE IX - WORK LOAD

\* \* \*

### C. Definitions of School Day

1. Normal School Day. The normal school day will be 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Teachers should be available to the pupils, upon their request, by 8:00 a.m., as well as after dismissal time.

D. Lunch Period All teachers shall receive a daily, uninterrupted, duty-free lunch period of 45 minutes.

## ARTICLE X - WORK LOAD

\* \* \*

### E. Preparation Periods

1. Elementary Teachers. Elementary classroom teachers will be provided no less than 200 minutes of preparation time in a normal week. This preparation time will be scheduled between 8:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m., excluding the duty-free lunch period.
2. Middle School. Middle school teachers who are on a team will be guaranteed a minimum of 400 minutes prep time over a two week period (not counting team time). Middle school teachers who are not on a team will be guaranteed a prep time daily, the same minimum of 400 minutes in a two week period.

\* \* \*

### J. Wednesday Early Student Release

Thirteen early-out Wednesdays will be scheduled throughout the school year by the superintendent for classroom work to be determined by individual teachers. The time allotted under this provision shall be in addition to the regular teacher preparation time provided in Article X.E.

## ARTICLE XV - EFFECT OF AGREEMENT

\* \* \*

- D. Scope of Agreement. This agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties. Any amendment supplemental hereto shall not be binding upon either party unless executed by the parties hereto. The parties further acknowledge that during the course of collective bargaining each party has had the unlimited right to offer, discuss, accept or reject proposals. Therefore, for the term of this Agreement, no further collective bargaining shall be had upon any provision of this Agreement, nor upon any subject of collective bargaining unless by mutual consent of the parties hereto.

4. For the 2008-2009 school year, teachers at Graff and the Laurel Middle School received a daily, recess duty-free, uninterrupted lunch period of 45 minutes in conformity with the 2008-2011 CBA. During that year they also received no less than the amount of preparation time provided for in the 2008-2011 CBA.

5. Prior to 2007, grades 1 through 5 were taught at the Graff School and grades 6 through 8 were taught at the Laurel Middle School. Beginning with the 2007-2008 school year, grades 3 and 4 were taught at Graff and grades 5 through 8 were taught at the Laurel Middle School.

6. For the 2007-2008 school year at the Graff school, the third and fourth graders had a 15 minute afternoon recess on Monday and Friday. There was no afternoon recess for third and fourth grade students on Wednesday. During the 2008-2009 school year, only the afternoon recess for the fourth graders was eliminated.

7. For the 2007-2008 school year, the certified personnel received a 50 minute long, recess duty-free, uninterrupted lunch period. In addition, the certified personnel received no less than the amount of preparation time required by the applicable CBA.

8. The CBAs prior to the 2005-2006 year provided that the certified personnel's school day began at 8:15 a.m. and ended at 4:00 p.m. Beginning with the 2005-2006 CBA, the certified personnel's school day was extended to 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Article IX-C, 2005-2006 CBA, Exhibit 13.

9. The negotiations for the 2005-2006 year were undertaken under the procedural requirements of interest based bargaining (IBB). During the negotiations, the Association's team indicated that its membership "is more receptive now to the idea of an 8-4 workday, with the clarification that an ad hoc committee would be formed to address how the day would be structured for all levels." Exhibit VV. The records of that bargaining show that the Association proposed an 8:00 to 4:00 workday with an ad hoc committee. The school district's counter offer to that offer was an 8:00 to 4:00 workday without the ad hoc committee. The Association ultimately accepted the school district's last offer which implemented the 8:00 to 4:00 workday but did not include the ad hoc committee.

10. The work day of the certified personnel is broken up into various types of time. Time during which the teachers are required to teach students is the required teacher-student contact time. Teachers also have teacher preparation time as prescribed by the CBAs (200 minutes per week for the Graff school teachers and 400 minutes per two week period for the Laurel Middle School teachers). There is also the recess duty-free time for lunch. Finally, there is a fourth type of time which is understood to be unassigned time which teachers may use for such things as preparing their class rooms but which is not part of, and which is not to be counted against, the CBA set preparation time. Likewise, it is not part of and not to be counted against the teacher's recess duty-free lunch period.

11. It is clear from the working relationship and the conduct of the parties over the past several years that the parties have implicitly recognized that a portion of the teachers' day between the contractually defined arrival time of 8:00 a.m. and leave time of 4:00 p.m. is and may be devoted to unassigned teaching time. The unassigned teaching time is an important part of the teachers' day. As the complainant argues, and the hearing officer finds as a matter of fact, the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. time frame of the collective bargaining agreement represents the parameter of the teachers' contractual workday. The time between 8:00 a.m. and the first class bell and the time between the dismissal bell and 4:00 p.m. has traditionally been preserved as unassigned teaching time. It is an important part of the teachers' work day and the teachers have never and would never agree without first bargaining to any arrangement that would do away with the unassigned teaching time that the teachers enjoyed until the 2008-2009 school year.

12. As a result of the increased assigned student contact time and the resultant loss of unassigned time, teachers at both Graff and Laurel Middle School have been forced to do additional work on weekends and after 4:00 p.m. In addition, they have been forced to arrive at work and begin daily class preparation long before the 8:00 a.m. arrival time required by the 2008-2011 CBA.

13. At no time during the negotiations over the 2008-2011CBA did the school district ever broach the possibility of extending the assigned teacher-student contact time. Other subjects, such as the school district's concern that the teachers' 50 minute lunch period was too long and deleteriously affecting student discipline issues, were discussed. The parties were able to reach an understanding on this issue which resulted in the Association agreeing to reduce the required recess duty-free lunch period from 50 to 45 minutes. In return, an equal amount of unassigned time was given back to the teachers on Wednesday afternoons.

14. After the completion of negotiation on the 2008-2011 CBA and prior to the commencement of the 2008-2009 school year, the school district decided that it needed to increase the amount of assigned student contact time between the certified personnel and the students. The school district unilaterally implemented an increase in the assigned student contact time by extending the class start times and end times at both the Graff School and the Laurel Middle School.

15. The administration at both the Graff School and the Laurel Middle School did seek some individual teacher input on some of the proposed changes. However, the input system was informal and teachers were not required to give their input. Of greater consequence to this proceeding is the fact that neither the administrators nor the school district sought the input of the Association. Indeed, there is no evidence that the school district even made the Association aware that it was seeking the input of individual teachers.

16. During the 2008-2009 school year, the school district's unilateral change resulted in an increase in the teacher-student contact time and a concomitant substantial loss of unassigned time. At Graff School, the third grade teachers lost 15 minutes per day or 75 minutes per week in unassigned time. Fourth grade teachers lost 30 minutes per day or a total of 135 minutes per week. At the Laurel Middle School, teachers lost 17 minutes per day or a total of 85 minutes per week.

17. A comparison of the 2008-2009 changes at the Laurel Middle School to earlier year's changes demonstrates that the school district's unilateral changes had a substantial negative impact on the teachers' unassigned time. For the 2007-2008 school year, for example, the assigned time (the time that the students were in class) changed from an 8:20 a.m. start time during the preceding year to an 8:35 a.m. start time for 2007-2008. The student dismissal time changed from 3:28 p.m. to 3:35 p.m. The result was a net 8 minute **increase** per day in unassigned time of 8 minutes. In 2005-2006 and again in 2006-2007, classes began five minutes earlier than they had in the 2004-2005 school year but ended 12 minutes earlier than they had during the 2004-2005 school year. The result was a net **increase** in teacher unassigned time of seven minutes per day for the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years. As stated above, the unilateral changes for the 2008-2009 school year resulted in a substantial **decrease** in the teachers' unassigned teaching time.

18. A similar comparison at the Graff school likewise demonstrates a substantial negative impact on teacher unassigned time that came about as a result of the school district's unilateral scheduling change. For the 2007-2008 school year, classes began five minutes later and ended ten minutes earlier per week for the third grade teachers. With the implementation of the recess changes, the third grade teachers taught only an additional 10 minutes each week. The fourth grade teachers saw a net reduction in their assigned teaching time of 50 minutes per week (with a corresponding increase in their unassigned time). In contrast, in 2008-2009, the third grade teachers saw a 50 minute increase in their assigned teaching time (and a corresponding 50 minute reduction in their unassigned teaching time). Unquestionably, the teachers at both Laurel Middle School and Graff suffered a substantial reduction of their unassigned time during the 2008-2009 school year as a result of the district's unilateral changes.

19. Upon learning of the school district's decision to increase the assigned teacher-student time, and prior to the implementation of the increased assigned teacher-student time, Association President Brent Scott wrote to Superintendent Josh Middleton on May 12 and May 29, 2009 about the proposed changes for both the Graff School and the Laurel Middle School.

Exhibit 1. Scott informed the district that several teachers had contacted him with concerns over the impact of the changes on those teachers' schedules and the loss of unassigned time. He pointed out that while the district had the power to implement changes, the district was required to bargain over the impact of those changes upon the teachers. He then requested that the school district engage in bargaining over those changes.

20. In response, Middleton flatly refused to engage in any bargaining. Middleton further noted in his letter that he was "troubled and offended by both letters with implied malfeasance by the district." Association Exhibit 2.

21. On September 5, 2009, Scott sent Middleton a renewed demand to bargain over the proposed changes. This time, he pointed out that the unilateral implementation of the additional student contact time would effectively result in adding two weeks of additional teaching time for the teachers. Association Exhibit 3. Middleton again refused to negotiate over the changes, positing that the changes fit within the language of the 2008-2011 CBA.

22. As a result of the school district's refusal to bargain over the impact on the teachers' unassigned time, the Association brought the instant unfair labor practices against the school district. Association Exhibits 4 and 5.

#### IV. DISCUSSION<sup>1</sup>

##### A. Preliminary Evidentiary Issues

###### 1. Preclusion of the witnesses and exhibits in the May 7, 2009 order was appropriate.

From the outset of this case, the parties sought to have the matter litigated, briefed and decided prior to the start of the 2009-2010 school year. With this important parameter in mind, the hearing officer carefully weighed the various discovery violations as well as the imposition of the least onerous remedy that would rectify the violations.

At the scheduling conference originally held on January 12, 2009, the parties specifically agreed to a hearing schedule that required the parties to complete all discovery by April 14, 2009 and to file their respective list of witnesses, exhibits, and motions no later than April 16, 2009. A final pre-hearing conference was set for May 7, 2009 and the hearing was set for May 12 and 13, 2009.

The parties undertook discovery. Within 8 days after the scheduling order went out, the Association propounded interrogatories. These interrogatories plainly sought the names of all persons whom the school district knew to have knowledge of the issues of the case and sought

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<sup>1</sup>Statements of fact in this discussion are incorporated by reference to supplement the findings of fact. *Coffman v. Niece* (1940), 110 Mont. 541, 105 P.2d 661.

disclosure of all the exhibits the district had in its possession. See pages 3 and 4 of the Association's motion to quash subpoenas dated May 4, 2009. Information about the witnesses and exhibits ultimately excluded by this tribunal's order on May 7, 2009 were clearly within the scope of the information sought by the Association's interrogatories. Despite this, no information about these witnesses or exhibits was produced.

In April, a discovery dispute arose about the school district's belated request to depose two of the Association's witnesses. The district's last minute request to depose these witnesses created a difficult scheduling problem for the witnesses. The district had ample time to schedule the witnesses but waited for over two months until just a few days before the close of discovery to arrange the depositions. As a result, the hearing officer intervened and reset the depositions. In addition, to permit the district to utilize the information it received from the depositions, the hearing officer extended the date for exchange of witnesses to April 22, 2009, but did not extend the discovery deadline.

On April 22, 2009, seven days after the discovery deadline closed, the school district served supplemental discovery responses upon the Association identifying for the first time witnesses Vi Hill, Amy Caldiera, Val Naumen, and Richard Trerise. The school district also disclosed for the first time Exhibits H, I, J, L, N, EE, FF, GG, and HH. The Association brought this discovery violation to the attention of the hearing officer in a motion filed on May 4, 2009. At the final pre-hearing conference, the motion to preclude was argued and the witnesses and exhibits noted above were excluded for failure to timely disclose them.

It is patently obvious in that the school district, despite requesting that the matter be set for the hearing dates and discovery deadlines in order to achieve the parties' mutual goal of resolving this dispute before the commencement of the school year, did nothing to engage in meaningful discovery until very late in the discovery period. The school district created the situation of which it now complains. Despite agreeing to the April 14, 2009 deadline in order to accomplish its own goal of a timely hearing, the school district failed to disclose any of these precluded witnesses or exhibits until one week after the discovery period had closed. By the time the witnesses and exhibits were disclosed, there was no way that the Association could have been prepared to meet that evidence. In addition, because the parties wanted to have the matter settled before the 2009-2010 school year began, there was no viable way to permit a continuance. For all three of these reasons, the hearing officer concludes that the exclusion of witnesses Vi Hill, Amy Caldiera, Val Naumen, and Richard Trerise and Exhibits H, I, J, L, N, EE, FF, GG, and HH was appropriate under the applicable rules. *See, e.g., Montana Rail Link v. Byard* (1993), 260 Mont. 331, 344, 860 P.2d 121, 129 (holding that the hearing examiner properly precluded witness's testimony where the witness was not disclosed in response to interrogatories).

2. *Preclusion of Andrea Fischer's and Randy Peers' testimony is not appropriate.*

The Association requests that Amy Fischer and Randy Peers' testimony be precluded because they violated the rule of exclusion of witnesses. For the reasons stated during the hearing, the hearing officer declines to preclude the testimony of Andrea Fischer. Despite the Association's perceptions to the contrary, the hearing officer is satisfied that Fischer did not hear and could not hear other witnesses' testimony while she was in the enclosed office space. Therefore, no factual basis exists for precluding her testimony since she did not violate the rule of exclusion.

Unlike Fischer, Randy Peers was present during a portion of the testimony of Brent Scott. Peers indicated, and the hearing officer has no reason to believe otherwise, that Peers was not present during the order excluding witnesses and was not aware of the order. Counsel for the school district was not aware that Peers was in the room during Scott's testimony. The only portion of Scott's testimony that Peers heard was Scott's discussion about what Scott did when he arrived at school in the morning and things that he did during the day.

Peers only testified about his involvement in the 2005-2006 CBA negotiations and nothing else. Scott's testimony did not involve anything about the 2005-2006 negotiations.

The rule of exclusion of witnesses is designed to prevent a witness's testimony from being influenced by another witness's testimony. Here, that could not happen since Scott's testimony did not touch upon the issues that Peers testified about. Hence, the rationale of *U.S. v. Hobbs*, 31 F.3d 918(9th Cir. 1994) applies to this case. Peers' testimony should not be excluded.

### 3. Admission of Documents UU and VV is proper.

It is a basic legal axiom that when a party places a matter in issue, that party waives any privilege associated with that issue. The reason is simple. Due process requires an opposing party to be able to adequately defend against a claim. Balancing the privilege against the due process rights of the school district, admission of the evidence is required in order to accord the defendant the process it is due in this case. *Cf.*, *Winslow v. Montana Rail Link*, 2001 MT 269, 307 Mont. 269, 38 P.3d 148.

Here, the Association has sued the school district claiming that it engaged in an unfair labor practice. Evidence of the bargaining history of the parties is essential to defend against that type of charge. Here, the Association seeks to assert an unfair labor practice and at the same time seeks to use mediation privilege as a sword to prevent the school district from fully and fairly litigating that issue. Due process does not permit that and on that basis alone, the hearing officer would deny the Association's motion to exclude Exhibits UU and VV.

Beyond this, the hearing officer agrees with the school district that the privilege does not apply to this evidence because labor negotiations between a public school district and its employee Association is not confidential. Therefore, the requisites of Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-

813 do not exist in this case for enforcing the privilege. *Great Falls Tribune Co., Inc. V. Great Falls Public Schools* (1992), 255 Mont. 125, 841 P.2d 502.

The Association also argues that Rules 403 and 408 of the Rules of Evidence apply to preclude the admission of these two documents. The hearing officer does not agree. Rule 403 applies to prohibit introduction of otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is **substantially** outweighed by the danger of **unfair** prejudice, confusion of the issues, or based on considerations of undue delay or waste of time. Evidence showing the nature of past bargaining practice is essential to the determination of any unfair labor practice. It, therefore, is not unfair prejudice.

Rule 408 has no application because it only applies when the evidence is offered to prove a party's liability by showing that the party offered to compromise the dispute prior to litigation. It does not preclude such evidence where the offer is for some other relevant purpose. *Kiely Construction, LLC v. City of Red Lodge*, 2002 MT 241, ¶95, 312 Mont. 52, 57 P.3d 836. Here, the school district is not using the evidence to show liability by an offer to compromise. Therefore, Rule 408 has no bearing on the admissibility of Exhibits UU and VV. Accordingly, admission of Documents UU and VV is proper.

## B. *The School Board Engaged In An Unfair Labor Practice.*

The Association contends that the school district engaged in an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally implemented an increase in the assigned teacher-student contact time without bargaining over the impact that change would have on the teachers' working conditions. Complainant's opening brief, page 2. The Association does not quarrel with the school district's management right to change the teachers' schedule during their contractual workday.

The school district argues that the collective bargaining agreement gives the school district the right to implement the unilateral change without bargaining over the impact of the changes and that in any event the Association waived its right to bargain over the impact of the changes because it had in the past acquiesced in de minimus changes in the schedule. The school district further argues that the district had already carried out its duty to bargain with the Association over the structure of the teachers' workday as evidenced by the negotiations over the 2005-2006 bargaining agreement. With respect to this facet of the school district's argument, the school district contends that the evidence shows that during that negotiating session, the Association attempted to insert itself in structuring the teachers' workday but that through negotiation and agreement of the 2005-2006 CBA, the Association in effect gave up that right.<sup>2</sup>

The Montana Supreme Court has approved the practice of the Board of Personnel Appeals of using federal court and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedents as guidance in interpreting the Montana collective bargaining laws. *State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals v. District Court* (1979), 183 Mont. 223, 598 P.2d 1117; *City of Great Falls v. Young (Young III)* (1984), 211 Mont. 13, 686 P.2d 185.

The purpose of the Montana statutory provisions governing collective bargaining for public employees is to remove certain recognized sources of labor strife and unrest by encouraging "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and their employees." Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-101; *Bonner School District No. 14 v. Bonner Education Association*, 2008 MT 9, ¶32, 341 Mont. 97, 176 P.2d 262. Public employers are obligated "to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours, fringe benefits and other conditions of employment." Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-305(2). An employer commits an unfair labor practice under Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(5) if it fails to bargain on mandatory subjects of bargaining. *Bonner*, ¶17.

An employer violates its duty to bargain in good faith when it unilaterally changes an existing term or condition of employment without bargaining that change to impasse. *NLRB v.*

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<sup>2</sup> In its answer to the unfair labor practice, the school district also defended its unilateral increase in assigned teacher-student contact time on the basis of exigent circumstances. Prior to hearing, the district withdrew this defense.

*McClatchy Newspapers* (D.C. Cir. 1992), 964 F. 2d 1153, 1162. When a collective bargaining agreement is in place, an employer must obtain the union's consent before implementing any change to the agreement. Where a mandatory subject of bargaining is not covered by the collective bargaining agreement, an employer must bargain the issue to impasse before it can implement a unilateral change. *International Union (UAW) v. NLRB*, 765 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

The impact of the changes here upon the teachers' schedules is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Indeed, the school district all but concedes this in light of the Montana Supreme Court's decision in *Bonner*, *supra*, by noting that *Bonner* "suggests that the schedule changes implemented by the school district are mandatory conditions . . ." Defendant's opening brief, page 24. In fact, the principles of *Bonner* demonstrate that the substantial change in the teachers' previously understood unassigned prep time, a change which added at least 75 minutes of required contact time at Graff and at least 85 minutes at the Laurel Middle School, was a change in the terms and conditions of employment, the impact of which upon the teachers was subject to bargaining unless waived either by past bargaining history or by the language of the 2008-2011 CBA itself. *Bonner*, ¶32. See also, *Indian River School Board v. Indian River County Education Association*, 373 So. 2d 412 (Fla App. 1979) (holding that changing a teaching day which consisted of seven class periods, five of which were 50 minutes long, one of which was 25 minutes long, and one of which was 10 minutes long, for a total teaching time of 285 minutes per day, to a seven class period day of six 47 minute periods and one 15 minute period, for a total of 287 minutes per day of teaching time, was a change subject of mandatory bargaining) and *Taylor Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education*, 255 N.W. 2d 651 (Mich App. 1977) (additional 15 minutes of student contact time that the school board unilaterally imposed upon teachers was a condition of employment subject to mandatory bargaining).

As the impact of the schedule changes was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the school district is relegated to arguing that the Association waived its right to bargain over this issue. A waiver can occur either by express provisions in the CBA, by the parties' bargaining history, or by a combination of both. *Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. NLRB*, 540 F.3d 1072, 1079, footnote 10, (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008), citing *Am. Distributing Co. v. NLRB*, 715 F.2d 446 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). The school district must prove the waiver. An express contractual waiver must be "explicitly stated, clear and unmistakable." *Local Joint Executive Board*, *supra*, 540 F.2d at 1079. In order to demonstrate a waiver by bargaining history, the matter at issue must have been "fully discussed, and consciously explored during negotiations and the union [must] have consciously yielded or clearly and unmistakably waived its interest in the matter." *Id.*, citing *Johnson-Bateman Co.*, 295 NLRB 180, 185 (1989). Taken as a whole, the evidence in this case does not support the school district's argument either that the language of the 2008-2011 CBA constitutes a waiver of the right to bargain over the impact of the reduction of the unassigned time or that past negotiations demonstrate a waiver of the right to bargain over the impact.

The hearing officer agrees with the Association's argument that nothing in the 2008-2011 CBA language amounts to an explicit, stated, clear, and unmistakable waiver of the right

to bargain over the impact of the reduced unassigned time. As the Association points out, the language of the CBA is silent on the issue of bargaining the impact over an increase in assigned teacher-student time. It does not give the school district the right to schedule assigned teacher-student contact time without bargaining over the impact of doing so. Indeed, the language of the contract indicates to the contrary, stating that the teachers "should be available to the pupils, **upon their request**, by 8:00 a.m. as well as after dismissal time." (Emphasis added). Implicit in this language is the notion that the teachers are in fact entitled to unassigned teaching, provided that they are available to the students upon the *student's* request. Certainly, the language does not require the teachers to be available at the school district's request. Had the parties intended to make the teachers subject to assigned teaching duties at all times between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., the language of the CBA would have said as much. This specific provision does not amount to a plain and unmistakable waiver of the right to bargain over the impact of increases in assigned teaching time.

The school district's argument that the management rights clause and integration clause constitutes a waiver is unpersuasive. As the Association correctly notes, the National Labor Relations Board has consistently rejected management rights clauses that are couched in general terms and make no reference to any particular subject area as waivers of statutory bargaining rights. *Smurfit-Stone Container Corp.*, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 557, at 23-25; *Michigan Bell Telephone Co.* (1992), 306 NLRB 281. The management rights clause in the 2008-2011 CBA does not authorize the school district to make unilateral changes in conditions of employment without collective bargaining and, therefore, does not demonstrate a waiver.

The hearing officer also agrees with the Association that the effect of the zipper clause in this case is to protect employees from unilateral changes in working conditions. By agreeing that one party cannot force another party to bargain, the parties have agreed to maintenance of the *status quo*. An employer cannot implement a unilateral change in working conditions and then use the zipper clause as a sword to justify its refusal to discuss a unilateral change in the *status quo*. *Pepsi Cola Distributing Co.*, 241 NLRB 869 (1979). An agreement that neither party is obligated to bargain is a double-edged sword. It applies to both parties and because neither can be forced to bargain, neither can force the other to accept a change in the *status quo*. See, *The Mead Corporation* (1995), 318 NLRB 201; ULP No. 17-98 (1999), *Frenchtown Education Association v. Frenchtown Public Schools*. See also, *Michigan Bell Telephone Co.*, *supra*.

Likewise, nothing in the bargaining history of the parties suggests a clear and unmistakable waiver of the mandatory bargaining subject at issue in this case. The school district's contention that the lack of the inclusion of an ad hoc committee into the 2005-2006 CBA somehow shows a waiver is unconvincing. As the Association aptly points out in its post-hearing responsive brief, there is nothing but purest speculation in the record as to why that ad hoc committee was not included in the final CBA. More importantly, even if the reasons were known for not including the ad hoc committee, there is no way to know what the ad hoc committee might or might not have done had it come into existence. The deletion of the ad

hoc committee from the 2005-2006 CBA negotiations does not plainly and unmistakably show that the Association waived its right to bargain over the impact of the changes.

The changes in the 2005-2006 CBA which resulted in changing the beginning of the teachers' workday from 8:15 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. does not clearly point to a waiver. At most, it signifies that the teachers agreed to begin their contractual day at 8:00 a.m. and nothing more. It does not at all speak to whether the teachers gave up their right to bargain over the impact of the addition of assigned teacher-student contact time.

Finally, to suggest that the past practice of soliciting input from individual teachers somehow waives the right of the Association to bargain flies in the face of the very principles underlying collective bargaining. Here, there is no indication that the teachers' acknowledged representative, the Association, either explicitly or tacitly condoned such input as a substitute for the power of the Association to bargain on behalf of the teachers. Also, as the Association correctly notes, in order to be waived, the issue must have been fully discussed and consciously explored **during negotiations**. *Local Joint Executive Board, supra*, 540 F.2d at 1079. Any input received from the teachers was individual input which was not received in negotiations. To permit the school district to prevail on this argument would result in an "end run" around the purposes of the public employees collective bargaining.

In sum, the school district has failed to meet its burden to show that either the language of the 2008-2011 CBA or the bargaining history of the parties demonstrates that the Association waived its right to bargain over the mandatory subject of the impact of the increase in assigned teacher-student contact time. The Association has thus proven the unfair labor practice charges against the school district.

### **C. The Remedy For the Violation.**

Upon determining by a preponderance of the evidence that an unfair labor practice has occurred, the Board of Personnel Appeals shall issue and serve an order requiring the entity named in the complaint to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-406(4). The Board shall further require the offending entity to take such affirmative action, which may include restoration to the *status quo ante*, "as will effectuate the policies of the chapter." *Id.* See also, *Keeler Die Cast* (1999), 327 NLRB 585, 590-91; *Los Angeles Daily News* (1994), 315 NLRB 1236, 1241.

The proper remedy here is to order the school district to cease and desist implementation of the increased assigned teacher-student contact time, to restore the status quo ante, and to require the school district to engage in good faith bargaining with the Association if the school district seeks to increase the assigned teacher-student contact time. In addition, an order requiring the school district to reinstate all leave taken by members of the Association in order to participate in the proceedings held on May 12 and 13, 2009 is appropriate.

The evidence is inconclusive as to whether any teacher's additional work outside his or her 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. time actually resulted from the school district's unfair labor practice. No witness articulated specific examples of increased work load outside the regular contract hours that resulted from the unilateral increase in the assigned teacher-student contact time. There was also credible evidence that, because of the teachers' obvious dedication to their work, they might in any event be working outside the 8:00 to 4:00 hours. In light of the inability to establish a direct link between the unfair labor practice and any loss of wages, the hearing officer agrees with the school district that imposition of back pay is inappropriate.

## V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Board of Personnel Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-405.

2. The Association has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the school district's refusal to bargain over the impact of the district's decision to increase the assigned teaching time for the 2008-2009 school year was an unfair labor practice that violated Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(1) and (5).

3. Imposition of an order requiring the school district to cease and desist implementation of the increased assigned teacher-student contact, to restore the status quo ante, and to require the district to bargain to impasse the impact of any changes in assigned teaching time prior to implementing such changes is appropriate pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-406(4).

4. An award of back pay is not supported by the facts of this case and, therefore, is not an appropriate remedy.

## VI. RECOMMENDED ORDER

Yellowstone County School District Nos. 7 & 70 are hereby ORDERED:

1. To immediately cease and desist implementation of the increased assigned teacher-student contact and to restore the status quo ante;

2. To bargain in good faith with the Association if the school district seeks to increase the assigned teacher-student contact time; and

3. No later than 30 days after the entry of the Board's final order in this matter:

a. To reinstate all leave taken by members of the Association in order to participate in the proceedings held on May 12 and 13, 2009, and

b. To post copies of the notice contained in Appendix A at conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted at the school for a period of 60 days and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2009.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By: /s/ GREGORY L. HANCHETT  
GREGORY L. HANCHETT  
Hearing Officer

NOTICE: Exceptions to these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order may be filed pursuant to Admin. R. Mont. 24.26.215 within twenty (20) days after the day the decision of the hearing officer is mailed, as set forth in the certificate of service below. If no exceptions are timely filed, this Recommended Order shall become the Final Order of the Board of Personnel Appeals. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-406(6). Notice of Exceptions must be in writing, setting forth with specificity the errors asserted in the proposed decision and the issues raised by the exceptions, and shall be mailed to:

Board of Personnel Appeals  
Department of Labor and Industry  
P.O. Box 6518  
Helena, MT 59624-6518

APPENDIX A

**NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES  
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE STATE OF MONTANA  
BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS**

The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals has found that we violated the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.

We will not fail to bargain in good faith with the Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT;

We will cease immediately from requiring the additional teacher-student contact time that was implemented during the 2008-2009 school year and cease otherwise altering terms and conditions of employment subject to the collective bargaining agreement with the Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT without prior bargaining with the Laurel Education Association, MEA-MFT;

We will engage in negotiations with the Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT applicable to members of the bargaining unit.

DATED this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2009.

Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT

By: \_\_\_\_\_

Board Chair:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Office:

**STATE OF MONTANA  
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY  
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES  
CASE NOS. 558-2009 and 666-2009**

LAUREL UNIFIED EDUCATION  
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA-MFT,

Petitioners,

- vs -

YELLOWSTONE COUNTY SCHOOL  
DISTRICT NOS. 7 and 70,

Respondent.

**FINAL ORDER**

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**INTRODUCTION**

The above-captioned matter came before the Board of Personnel Appeals (Board) on November 19, 2009. Lawrence Martin, attorney for Respondent, appeared on behalf of Yellowstone County School Districts Nos. 7 and 70 (school district), and Vicki McDonald, attorney for the complainant, appeared on behalf of Laurel Unified Education Association, MEA-MFT (Association).

This matter began after the Association filed two unfair labor practice complaints against Yellowstone County School Districts Nos. 7 and 70 (school district). The Association asserted that the school district committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally increasing the assigned teacher-student contact time without bargaining with the Association over the impact those changes. The Department of Labor and Industry's Hearings Bureau (Department) conducted a consolidated contested case hearing on behalf of the Board on May 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup>, 2009, in Laurel, Montana. The hearing officer issued his proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order (proposed order) on August 14, 2009.

Following the issuance of the proposed order, the school district filed its exceptions with the Board specifically, the school district contends that Findings of Fact Nos. 9 through 13, 15, 17, and 18 are not based on competent, substantial evidence and further, the school district asserted a total of 13 legal errors. Following the conclusion of the briefing schedule, the parties were afforded the opportunity to present oral argument.

Prior to oral argument, counsel for the Association, Vickie McDonald, submitted a written objection to the school district's submission of an "unofficial transcript" of the contested case proceeding before the hearing officer. At the beginning of the hearing, the Board entertained the objection and sustained the Association's objection. Thus, the "unofficial transcript" was not considered by the Board in reaching its conclusion.

In argument, the school district asserted that the hearing officer's findings were flawed and that the conclusions of law were in error, specifically, the school district asserted that the express language of the collective bargaining agreement indicates the intent of the parties to waive bargaining on the subject of class scheduling and further, that the Association's past practices and the bargaining history between the parties indicates an implied waiver of the right to bargain on this subject. In response, the Association asserted that there had been no waiver on this subject either express or implied. In previous years, the changes to class scheduling had been *de minimus* and therefore, there was no need to protest the school district's actions.

### ANALYSIS

The Board may adopt the proposal for decision as the Department's final order. The Board, in its final order, may reject or modify the conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules in the proposal for decision but may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless it first determines from a review of the complete record and states with particularity in the order that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. *Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-621(3)*

After careful consideration of the parties' arguments the Board discussed the matter at length and determined that the hearing officer's proposed findings of fact were based on competent substantial evidence and further that his conclusions of law were not in error.

Accordingly, the Board **affirms** the decision of the hearing officer with a modification to clarify the recommended order.<sup>1</sup>

1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Board adopts and incorporates the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order issued by the Hearings Bureau on August 14, 2009, with the modification noted in paragraph 2.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ¶ 2, in the Recommended Order is to be replaced and modified as follows to clarify and comport with the hearing officer's

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<sup>1</sup> At the oral argument, both parties voiced a desire for the Board's order to indicate a "time frame" for Respondent's implementation of the Board's order, however, the language of the Hearing Officer's order indicates that the Respondent is to "immediately" restore the "status quo." *Hearing Officer's Proposed Order, at 15, ¶ 1*. Without finding an error in the hearing officer's decision to order the immediate restoration of the status quo, the Board is reluctant to change this language.

conclusion of law No. 3; all parties agree that the school district is only obligated to bargain with the Association over "the impact" of increasing the assigned teacher-student contact time, not necessarily over its decision to increase the assigned teacher-student contact time:

2. To bargain in good faith with the Association over the impact of any changes to the assigned teacher-student contact time.

DATED this 30~~th~~ day of November, 2009.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By:   
Jack Holstrom, Presiding Officer


Board members Nyman, Johnson, Stanton, and Reardon concur.

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NOTICE: You are entitled to Judicial Review of this Order. Judicial Review may be obtained by filing a petition for Judicial Review with the District Court no later than thirty (30) days from the service of this Order. Judicial Review is pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-4-701, et seq., MCA.

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**CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I, , do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed to the following on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of December, 2009:

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