I. INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 2004, Bonner Education Association, MEA-MFT, filed a charge with the Board alleging that Bonner School District No. 14 had unilaterally and without bargaining involuntarily transferred certain teachers. On May 7, 2004, the defendant filed a response to the charge denying that its actions constituted an unfair labor practice.

On August 26, 2004, an investigator for the Board issued a finding that the charges had probable merit and transferred the case to the Hearings Bureau for a hearing on the charges.

Hearing Officer Anne L. MacIntyre conducted a hearing in the case on December 3, 2004. Karl J. Englund represented the association. Debra A. Silk represented the district. Julie Hasler Foley, Judy Karl, Doug Ardiana, Rosanne Hiday, and Pam Gannon testified as witnesses in the case. Exhibits 1 through 6 were admitted into evidence, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. Exhibits K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q were admitted over the association’s relevance objection. Exhibits R and S were also admitted without objection.
The parties filed post-hearing briefs on January 21 and January 24, 2005. At that time, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

II. ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether the Bonner School District No. 14 committed unfair labor practices in violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401, as alleged in the complaint filed by the Bonner Education Association.

III. RULINGS ON MOTIONS

On November 12, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for extension of time to file its answer in the case, attaching to the motion its proposed answer for filing. The complainant did not reply to the motion. On November 15, 2004, the complainant filed a motion for summary judgment and a brief in support of its motion. The defendant filed a reply brief in opposition to the motion on November 26, 2004. The complainant filed a response brief on November 30, 2004. The parties presented oral argument on the motion for summary judgment at the final pre-hearing conference on November 29, 2004.

The hearing officer granted the defendant’s motion for extension of time to file its answer at the commencement of hearing. The hearing officer deemed the answer that was attached to the motion filed.

The hearing officer orally denied the motion for summary judgment prior to the commencement of hearing by notifying the parties of her ruling telephonically. At the commencement of hearing, the hearing officer told the parties that the ruling on the motion would be incorporated into the hearing officer’s recommended order in the case. In view of the decision in this case in favor of the complainant, a separate ruling on the motion is moot, however.

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Bonner Education Association, MEA-MFT, is a “labor organization” within the meaning of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-103(6), and is the duly recognized exclusive representative of the certified personnel in the district.

3. The Board of Trustees of Bonner Public Schools is the governing body of the district and charged with supervision and control of the district.

4. Doug Ardiana was at all relevant times the superintendent of the district.

5. The Bonner Education Association and the Bonner School District have been parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements. The contract that was in effect at the time of this dispute covered the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years.

6. The contract contained a management rights clause at Article IV, Section 4.1, which provided:

   The Association recognizes the prerogatives of the Board to operate and manage the school district and retain, without limitation, all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it by law, except as limited by explicit terms of this agreement.

In Article X, the contract contained a provision for the filling of vacant or new positions which gave preference to current bargaining unit members and former bargaining unit members who had been laid-off. Article XI provided that layoffs would be done by seniority. Article XVI, Section 16.1(A) was the contract’s re-opener clause stating:

   This Agreement may be opened for re-negotiation, prior to the expiration date [June 30, 2004] with and only with the mutual agreement in writing of the Board and the BEA.

Article XVI, Section 16.2(B) was a prevailing rights clause that provided:

   This agreement shall not be interpreted to deprive teachers of professional advantages heretofore enjoyed, however, this does not incorporate these advantages into this contract.
7. The collective bargaining agreement also contained a clause, commonly known as an integration clause, in Article XVI, Section 16.2(A) that stated:

This Agreement constitutes the full and complete Agreement between the Board and the BEA. The provisions herein relating to salary, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment supersede any and all prior agreements, resolutions, practices, rules or regulations concerning salary, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment inconsistent with these provisions.

8. For 10 years prior to the events giving rise to this case, the district did not make involuntary, non-disciplinary transfers of teachers from one assignment to another.\(^1\)

9. Prior to the 2003-2004 school year, the only circumstances in which a teacher was reassigned occurred when the teacher exercised one of the rights under the collective bargaining agreement to fill a vacant position or bump a less senior teacher in the event of a layoff.

10. Ardiana became superintendent of the district prior to the beginning of the 2003-2004 school year. Prior to the beginning of school, Ardiana had several discussions with Julie Foley, the president of the association. In one of these conversations, Ardiana told Foley that he had reassigned teachers in previous positions he held as a school administrator, and would consider doing so in Bonner. Foley told him such reassignments had not been the practice in Bonner and “would cause a fight” if he did so there.

11. On January 5, 2004, Ardiana distributed a memo to the district’s teachers that stated:

In order to plan for the 2004-2005 school year, I would like to have some discussion regarding teacher assignment. I will be meeting with each teacher to discuss placement and possible rotation or change in teaching assignment. Please review and complete the form included with this memo. When I meet with you, I would like to review the form with you, collect the form and answer any questions that you may

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\(^1\)The evidence established that this had been the practice in the district for at least 33 years. Paragraph 8 of the findings is based on the parties’ stipulated fact.
have. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this process please see me directly.

12. On February 19, 2004, the association wrote to the chair of the school board and requested to bargain about involuntary transfers/reassignments. On March 1, 2004, the district responded to the association’s request by asserting that “assignments and transfers are not addressed in the collective-bargaining agreement and fall within management rights under Montana codes [sic] annotated.” The district stated that the association was “welcome to bring proposals about transfers . . .” to the bargaining table when the parties negotiated for a new contract. On March 9, 2004, the school board gave the superintendent the authority to make involuntary transfers of teaching assignments.

13. The parties commenced bargaining on or about March 24, 2004 for a successor agreement.

14. On April 7, 2004, the district announced that effective the start of the 2004-2005 school year, several teachers would be reassigned. Ultimately, the district implemented the following four involuntary reassignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher’s Name</th>
<th>Subjects and Grades Taught in 2003-2004</th>
<th>Reassigned by School District Administration to Subjects and Grade Being Taught 2004-2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mary Ann Strothman</td>
<td>7th and 8th grade English (6 sections)</td>
<td>Foreign Language (2 sections) Gifted/Talented Education (2 sections) Music Appreciation (1 section) 7th and 8th grade English (2 sections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erin Roberts</td>
<td>Special Education (all day)</td>
<td>7th and 8th grade English (2 sections) Art - all grades (5 sections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Hasler Foley</td>
<td>4th grade (all day)</td>
<td>Special Education (all day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilyn Chandler</td>
<td>7th and 8th grade Math (4 sections)</td>
<td>7th and 8th grade Math (4 sections) Computer (2 sections) Math Study Hall (1 section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th and 8th grade Foreign Cultures (2 sections)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. The reassignments were not disciplinary – none of the teachers were reassigned because of misconduct or poor performance. At the time the district announced the specific reassignments noted in ¶14, above, the parties were bargaining for a successor agreement. They had not reached impasse.

16. The reassignments were not made to achieve reductions in force.

17. Ardiana decided upon the involuntary reassignments unilaterally, taking into consideration the needs of the students, the needs of the district, budgetary considerations, the endorsements, certifications and experience of his current staff, and the desires of the individual teachers. He believed he had no obligation to bargain with the association in arriving at his decision.

18. One of the reassignments Ardiana initially announced on April 7, 2004, was of Judy Karl. In the 2003-2004 school year, Karl was employed as the computer teacher/technical systems administrator. The district reassigned her teaching duties but eliminated the technical systems administrator duties. The district reassigned Karl to teach fourth grade. The association grieved Karl’s reassignment, contending that because her position had been eliminated, she was entitled to exercise her rights under the layoff clause of the collective bargaining agreement. Karl and the association agreed to drop the grievance in exchange for the district’s agreement to assign Karl to a third grade teaching position.

19. The association also filed a grievance over the reassignment of Foley. Foley had been teaching fourth grade in the 2003-2004 school year, a position she had acquired under the vacancy provision of the collective bargaining agreement several years earlier. The district initially reassigned her to teach English classes and special education. Ultimately, her reassignment was to special education all day. Her grievance also contended that the reassignment violated the layoff provision of the collective bargaining agreement.

20. In a hearing on Foley’s grievance before the board, discussion ensued about whether the layoff provision of the collective bargaining agreement maintained any significance, in view of the rights of management to reassign teachers. Foley agreed that the district had the right to assign teachers.

21. The parties reached a successor collective bargaining agreement in August 2004. During the negotiation process, the association and the board bargained over transfer/reassignment language proposed by the association. Ultimately, the association dropped its proposed reassignment language in order to
settle the contract. The language in the 2004-2007 collective bargaining agreement concerning management rights, layoffs, vacancies, and professional advantages was unchanged from the 2002-2004 agreement.

22. The ability to continue to teach in a particular grade or subject area in which a teacher has previously taught is a professional advantage. Teachers gain expertise in the curriculum of their particular grade levels or subjects, acquire supplies and materials that can be used in successive years, sometimes expending their own funds, and obtain continuing education unique to their specific grade levels or subjects.

IV. DISCUSSION

The association contends that by involuntarily reassigning members of the bargaining unit on April 7, 2004, the district violated Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-31-401(1) and (5), in that the district unilaterally changed working conditions that are mandatory subjects of bargaining without first bargaining with (in fact, refusing to bargain with) the association.

The district maintains that its actions do not constitute an unfair labor practice by a public employer as set forth in Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-31-401(1) and (5). It contends that it has done nothing to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 39-31-201." Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(1). It contends that the involuntary reassignments were within its management rights both under the statute and the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. Furthermore, its actions do not constitute a violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(5), in that the district exercised its rights under the re-opener clause. It denies that it has refused to bargain with the association as evidenced by its willingness to negotiate over this matter once the current collective bargaining agreement was subject to renegotiation in accordance with Article 16.1. It also maintains that the charge is subject to dismissal based on principles of mootness and judicial estoppel.

2 Statements of fact in this opinion are hereby incorporated by reference to supplement the findings of fact. Coffman v. Niece (1940), 110 Mont. 541, 105 P.2d 661.
A. Obligation to Bargain


The basic, fundamental purpose of labor relations is the good faith negotiation of the mandatory subjects of bargaining—wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. For an employer to make unilateral changes during the course of a collective bargaining relationship concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining is a violation of the requirement of good faith bargaining. NLRB v. Katz (1962), 369 U.S. 736. Absent waiver or other relief from the obligation, it continues during the term of the collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co. (1939), 306 U.S. 332, 342.

It is undisputed that the district made unilateral involuntary reassignments of teachers on April 7, 2004. The issue is whether the district was obligated to bargain with the association and obtain its agreement before making these reassignments, or bargain to impasse with the association before making them. Answering this question requires a three-part analysis. NLRB v. U.S. Postal Service (D.C. Cir. 1993), 8 F.3d 832. First, are the assignments of current employees a mandatory subject of bargaining? Second, if so, did the 2002-2004 collective bargaining agreement give the district the right to change assignments of current employees without bargaining? Third, if not, did the association waive its rights to bargain over the issue of involuntary reassignments?

3In the course of this proceeding, the parties referred to the questioned act variously as assignment, transfer, and reassignment. For purposes of this decision, the hearing officer finds that the subject of bargaining at issue is assignment of current employees, and the alleged unfair labor practice should be characterized as involuntary reassignment.
In its contentions and post-hearing arguments, the district contends that it was not required to bargain because of the management rights provisions of state law set forth in Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-303 and of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The district does not distinguish between the two different sources of management rights, even though they are analytically distinct. The statutory provision is important for the first part of the analysis, i.e. whether involuntary reassignment is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The provision in the collective bargaining agreement relates to the second part of the analysis, whether the collective bargaining agreement authorized the district to make unilateral involuntary reassignments.

1. Subjects of Bargaining

On its face, the assignment of an employee is a condition of employment. It is therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining for purposes of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-305(2), which requires public employers to bargain in good faith with respect to “wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment.” However, the Collective Bargaining for Public Employees laws also provide:

Public employees and their representatives shall recognize the prerogatives of public employers to operate and manage their affairs in such areas as, but not limited to:

(1) direct employees;
(2) hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees;
(3) relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or funds or under conditions where continuation of such work be inefficient and nonproductive;
(4) maintain the efficiency of government operations;
(5) determine the methods, means, job classifications, and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted;
(6) take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the missions of the agency in situations of emergency;
(7) establish the methods and processes by which work is performed.


If Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-303 is construed as the district contends it should be, it conflicts with Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-305(2). The district argues that it was not required to bargain with the association over teacher assignment.
because it is within the management rights provided for in Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-303(2). However, Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-305(2) makes the issue of assignment of incumbent employees a matter over which bargaining is required because it is a condition of employment. The determination of whether assignment of incumbent employees is a mandatory subject requires that these statutes be harmonized. Federal decisions are of limited value in addressing this question because the National Labor Relations Act does not have statutory management rights language comparable to that contained in state law.

The Board has previously held that teacher transfers, and particularly involuntary transfers, are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Florence-Carlton Unit v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 15-6 (1979), ULP 5-77. The involuntary transfers addressed in that case are analogous to the involuntary reassignments at issue here. In harmonizing the Montana statutes that govern both the obligation to bargain and management rights, the Board adopted a balancing test based on court decisions from Kansas and Pennsylvania interpreting similar statutory management rights language in state collective bargaining laws. The Board held that the key in deciding whether an issue was a mandatory subject was “how direct the impact of an issue is on the well being of the individual teacher, as opposed to its effect on the operation of the school system as a whole.” Hearing officer's recommended order dated December 13, 1978, at 6, citing National Education Association of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Education (1973), 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426, superseded by statute, Unified School District No. 501 v. Department of Human Resources (1985), 235 Kan. 968, 685 P.2d 874; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District (1975), 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262.

As the Board noted in the Florence-Carlton case:

Topics proposed for negotiation, like words in a sentence, take on color and meaning from their surrounding context. Viewed in the abstract, the demand to negotiate over ‘the level of service to be provided’ for example, would seem to be a matter . . . not negotiable except at the discretion of the County. . . . In the context of a specific situation, however, a demand for a lower maximum case load for social workers, for example, although theoretically related to the level of

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4The Board adopted the recommended order as its final order on June 11, 1979.
service to be provided, might be much more directly related to the
terms and conditions of employment.


The Pennsylvania law presents a clearer conflict between a management
rights provision and the statutory requirement to bargain than that found in the
Montana statute in stating:

Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such
areas of discretion or policy as the functions and programs of the public
employer, standards of services, its overall budget, utilization of
technology, the organizational structure and selection and direction of
personnel.

Unified School District, supra, 337 A.2d at 265 (emphasis added). Establishing a rule
to resolve the conflict, the Pennsylvania court stated:

[W]e hold that where an item of dispute is a matter of
fundamental concern to the employees’ [sic] interest in wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment, it is not removed as a
matter subject to good faith bargaining under section 701 [which
defines collective bargaining] simply because it may touch upon basic
policy. It is the duty of the Board in the first instance and the courts
thereafter to determine whether the impact of the issue on the interest
of the employee [sic] in wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment outweighs its probable effect on the basic policy of the
system as a whole. If it is determined that the matter is one of
inherent managerial policy but does affect wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment, the public employer shall be required to
meet and discuss such subjects upon request by the public employee’s
[sic] representative pursuant to section 702 [which sets forth both the
management rights clause and the obligation to bargain].

337 A.2d at 268. Thus, even in the face of very strong statutory language ("shall not
be required to bargain"), the Pennsylvania court held that bargaining was
nevertheless required “where an item of dispute is a matter of fundamental concern
to the employees’ [sic] interest in wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment.”
See also West Hartford Education Association, Inc. v. DeCourcy (1972), 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526, 534-35, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court stated the following in interpreting the term “conditions of employment:”

To decide whether the rest of the items in question (a) are mandatory subjects of negotiation, we must direct our attention to the phrase “conditions of employment.” This problem would be simplified greatly if the phrase “conditions of employment” and its purported antithesis, educational policy, denoted two definite and distinct areas. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Many educational policy decisions make an impact on a teacher’s conditions of employment and the converse is equally true. There is no unwavering line separating the two categories. It is clear, nevertheless, that the legislature denoted an area which was appropriate for teacher-school board bargaining and an area in which such a process would be undesirable.

The balancing test the Board adopted in 1978 in reliance on the Kansas and Pennsylvania cases remains appropriate today. As the cases demonstrate, to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of the term “conditions of employment” would vitiate the requirement of the statute that public employer bargain in good faith, since nearly all conditions of employment implicate one or more of the management rights listed in Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-303.

As the Board held in Florence-Carlton, teacher transfers, both voluntary and involuntary, can have a great impact on the well-being of an individual teacher. Hearing officer’s recommended order, supra, at 12-13. Therefore, they are mandatory subjects of bargaining.


The district also contends that the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement allows the district to make involuntary reassignments of teachers. The language in question states that the association “recognizes the prerogatives of the Board to operate and manage the school district and retain, without limitation, all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it by law. . . .”

The district relies for its position on several cases in which the express terms of a collective bargaining agreement gave the employer a right to assign personnel. In NLRB v. U.S. Postal Service (D.C. Cir. 1993), 8 F.3d 832, the court held that
language in the collective bargaining agreement giving the employer the "exclusive right" to "hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees" and to "determine the methods, means, and personnel by which [its] operations are to be conducted" allowed the employer to reduce the hours of certain personnel without further bargaining. In *Uiforma/Shelby Business Forms, Inc. v. NLRB* (6th Cir. 1997), 111 F.3d 1284, the court held that language in a collective bargaining giving the employer the "sole right" to "schedule and assign work to employees [and] to establish and determine job duties and the number of employees required" allowed the employer to abolish a shift, transfer several employees to different shifts, and lay off 5 employees without bargaining. Thus, the courts in these cases held that the employers had bargained the issues in question with the representatives of the employees, the issues were covered by the collective bargaining agreements, and no further bargaining was required.

The language in the collective bargaining agreement between the association and the district does not give the district the right to make involuntary reassignments without bargaining. Unlike the agreements in the cases cited by the district, this collective bargaining agreement does not cede the "exclusive" or "sole" right to make assignments of personnel to the district. It makes no specific reference to assignments. The district contends, however, that because the agreement incorporates by reference the management rights provisions of statute, citing particularly Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-303, the agreement therefore allows involuntary reassignments.

According this language the interpretation advanced by the district poses a number of problems. First, the language itself is ambiguous. It does not specifically incorporate Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-303. However, even assuming the intent of the language is to incorporate that statutory provision by reference, it does not follow that the district has a sole or exclusive right to make unilateral involuntary reassignments. As noted in the discussion of whether assignments are mandatory subjects of bargaining supra, the statute does not give the district absolute discretion in the area of assignments. Rather, the right to make assignments has to be balanced against the obligation to bargain regarding conditions of employment. The statutory provision, if it is indeed incorporated by reference, is a provision that does not accord this absolute right to a public employer.

Second, the collective bargaining agreement contains several express provisions that are rendered meaningless if the district has the right to make involuntary reassignments. It gives preference to unit members who apply for vacancies and allows teachers who are subject to layoff to exercise seniority rights
with respect to other positions for which they are qualified. These provisions entail teachers to preferences for certain positions. However, if the district can make involuntary transfers of teachers who have exercised their rights under these provisions, the provisions of the agreement have no meaning.

In addition, the agreement provides that it may not be interpreted to "deprive teachers of professional advantages heretofore enjoyed, however, this does not incorporate these advantages into this contract." This language is also ambiguous, and the term "professional advantage" is not defined in the agreement. However, the association presented credible testimony that its members consider the ability to continue to teach in a subject or grade of a member's choice to be a professional advantage, and even Ardiana conceded this to be the case in testimony. To hold that the district can make involuntary reassignments is an interpretation that deprives teachers of a professional advantage previously enjoyed.

The hearing officer asked the parties to brief the question of the meaning of the professional advantages language, but neither party was able to cite any cases specifically on point. The district attempted to analogize to tenure cases, citing *Massey v. Argenbright* (1984), 211 Mont. 331, 683 P.2d 1332 and several other cases for the proposition that state law does not recognize a "professional advantage" to a particular teaching position. These cases, involving the right of tenured teachers to employment in any position for which they were certified when their existing positions were eliminated, are inapposite in the collective bargaining context. The reassignments at issue in this case were purely management initiatives undertaken by the district to reallocate personnel resources. The fact that tenured teachers could avoid layoffs by exercising tenure rights to positions other than the ones they held is irrelevant to the question of whether the district could reassign them without bargaining. The district's assertion that the association's position would restrict the tenure right to a particular position does not follow from holding that the teachers have a professional advantage to teaching in a position they prefer in the absence of layoffs. Procedures designed to apply the legal principles enunciated in *Massey* and the other cases cited by the district are expressly incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement between these parties in any event.

The language of the collective bargaining agreement does not support a holding that involuntary reassignments are permitted without bargaining.
3. Waiver

The third question in the analysis of whether the district had an obligation to bargain over the assignment of current employees is whether the union waived bargaining. The obligation to bargain collectively is an obligation that is subject to waiver by clear and unmistakable language. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB (1983), 460 U.S. 693; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Southwest Airlines Co. (5th Cir. 1989), 875 F.2d 1129, 1135; Honeywell International, Inc. v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 2001), 253 F.3d 125. The district cites the integration clause of the agreement in conjunction with the management rights clause to support its contention that the association waived its right to bargain during the term of the agreement.

The integration clause states that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement supersede “any and all prior agreements, resolutions, practices, rules or regulations concerning salary, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment inconsistent with these provisions.” Absent specific language in the collective bargaining agreement allowing the employer to make a unilateral change, a waiver clause does not allow an employer to make unilateral changes without bargaining. Thus, for example, in a case cited by the district, Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Co. (1984), 270 NLRB 686, aff'd sub nom International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1466, AFL-CIO v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1986), 795 F.2d 150, the NLRB held that it was not an unfair labor practice for the employer to eliminate, without bargaining, a Christmas bonus when the parties had included the following waiver clause in the agreement:

It is the intent of the parties that the provisions of this agreement will supersede all prior agreements and understandings, oral or written, express or implied, between such parties and shall govern their entire relationship and shall be the sole source of any and all rights or claims which may be asserted in arbitration hereunder or otherwise. The Union for the life of this Agreement hereby waives any rights to request to negotiate, or to negotiate or to bargain with respect to any matters contained in this Agreement.

270 NLRB at 688. In holding that the agreement allowed the employer to eliminate the Christmas bonus without bargaining, the NLRB relied chiefly on the first sentence of the waiver clause, the integration clause. It also considered the bargaining history which evidenced a clear intent on the part of the employer,
which had proposed the waiver language, to eliminate all past practices. See also TCI of New York, Inc. (1991), 301 NLRB 822.

The association argued strenuously that the district had a longstanding practice of not involuntarily reassigning teachers, which could not be unilaterally changed without bargaining. The district contended, based on the integration clause, that the alleged past practice had been eliminated. However, the question of whether there was a "past practice" is ultimately irrelevant to the unfair labor practice charge. The issue in the case is whether the district could change terms and conditions of employment without bargaining, and the assignment of current employees is a term or condition of employment, as discussed supra. Unless a specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement authorized a unilateral change in terms or conditions of employment, the integration clause is irrelevant to the analysis.

In this case, there is no evidence of bargaining history and no other language in the agreement that would support the right of the district to make a unilateral change. Although the district points again to the management rights clause as support for its waiver argument, the NLRB has consistently rejected management rights clauses that are couched in general terms and make no reference to any particular subject area as waivers of statutory bargaining rights. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 557, at 23-25; Michigan Bell Telephone Co. (1992), 306 NLRB 281. Thus, the management rights clause does not authorize the district to make unilateral changes in conditions of employment without collective bargaining.

Finally, the agreement contains a "zipper" clause that provides, "This Agreement may be opened for re-negotiation, prior to the expiration date, with and only with the mutual agreement in writing of the Board and the BEA." The effect of the zipper clause in this case is to protect employees from unilateral changes in working conditions. By agreeing that one party cannot force another party to bargain, the parties have agreed to maintenance of the status quo. Neither party may change the contract or working conditions without first bargaining. Since neither party is obligated to bargain, neither party can change the contract or working conditions. The zipper clause in this case precludes the district from implementing new terms or conditions of employment, in the absence of assent by the association. In other words, an agreement that neither party is obligated to bargain is a double-edged sword. It applies to both parties and because neither can be forced to bargain, neither can force the other to accept a change in the status quo. See, The Mead Corporation (1995), 318 NLRB 201; ULP No. 17-98 (1999), Frenchtown Education

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Association v. Frenchtown Public Schools. For additional discussion of these principles, see, Michigan Bell Telephone Co. (1992), 306 NLRB 281.

In this case, the district rejected the request of the association to bargain the issue of the reassignments and made unilateral changes in conditions of employment. The association did not waive its right to bargain, by any language in the collective bargaining agreement or otherwise.

4. Effect of Bargaining for a Successor Agreement

The district also points to its willingness to bargain over the issue of involuntary assignments in the negotiations for the 2004-2007 collective bargaining agreement in support of its position that it did not fail to bargain in good faith. This argument misses the point. The unilateral change in working conditions is the asserted unfair labor practice in this case. The district made the unilateral change in working conditions independent of any negotiations for a successor agreement. It did not address during bargaining the involuntary reassignments announced by Ardisian on April 7, 2004, except to the extent that it changed Karl’s assignment in response to her grievance.

5. Conclusion

Applying the principles discussed in this section to the facts of this case results in a determination that the district made a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining, the assignment of its teachers, and thereby committed an unfair labor practice. The change was inherently destructive of the policy of the Collective Bargaining Act set forth in Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-101, which is to remove sources of strife and unrest in public sector employment relations by encouraging collective bargaining. The district’s action in unilaterally changing teacher assignments constituted an unfair labor practice.

B. Mootness

The district contends that the unfair labor charge is moot based on the fact that the parties have negotiated a successor agreement to the 2002-2004 agreement. Citing Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1999 MT 21, 293 Mont. 188, 974 P.2d 1150, the district asserts that the Board is unable to afford the relief sought because the parties have, since the filing of the charge: a) negotiated staffing assignments for the current school year, b) started the current school year with assignments agreed to by both the association members and the district, c) paid and
received consideration for staffing assignments for the current school year, and
d) acknowledged there are no violations of the 2004-2007 collective bargaining
agreement.

With the possible exception of whether consideration has been paid and
received for the current year staffing assignments, no credible evidence supports the
district’s factual assertions on this point. Although the evidence supports a finding
that the district and the association negotiated a successor agreement, there is no
evidence they negotiated assignments. In the negotiations for the successor
agreement, the association proposed language on involuntary transfers, but the
district rejected the language. There is no evidence the association members agreed
to the assignments. The district infers acknowledgment that there are no violations
of the 2004-2007 agreement from the failure to file grievances. But this hardly
constitutes an acknowledgment. Even if it did, the issue in the unfair labor practice
charge is whether the district violated the statutory prohibition against refusing to
bargain in good faith. Whether the district violated the collective bargaining
agreement is irrelevant.

Even if the district had established these contentions as facts, they do not
establish that the charge is moot. In the Shamrock Motors case, the petitioner sought
judicial review of a decision holding that Ford Motor Company had properly
terminated its franchise. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner sold the
franchise to a third party. Because the petitioner was no longer a franchisee, the
question of whether the franchise was properly terminated was moot.

In this case, the complainant seeks a return to status quo ante and an order to
bargain about the assignments, among other things. This relief is not affected in
any way by the negotiation of a successor agreement and is clearly available in this
case. The facts are in no way analogous to those in the Shamrock Motors case. The
charge is not moot.

C. Judicial Estoppel

The district also contends that the association should be judicially estopped
from pursuing the unfair labor practice charge, based on an asserted concession by
representatives of the association in a grievance hearing that the district had a
unilateral right to reassign teachers.

The evidence establishes that the association filed a grievance concerning one
of the reassignments at issue in this case, that of Julie Foley, who was also the
president of the association. The grievance asserted that the reassignment violated the collective bargaining agreement. In the grievance hearing before the school board, Foley made a purported concession that the district had the right to assign teachers.

A party claiming that judicial estoppel bars another party from re-litigating an issue must show that: (1) the estopped party had knowledge of the facts at the time he or she took the original position; (2) the estopped party succeeded in maintaining the original position; (3) the position presently taken is inconsistent with the original position; and (4) the original position misled the adverse party so that allowing the estopped party to change its position would injuriously affect the adverse party.


The district has failed to establish the elements of judicial estoppel in this case. The purported concession made by Foley, which the district has taken entirely out of context, was not the association’s original position; the original position was that the reassignment violated the collective bargaining agreement. Further, the association did not succeed in its original position; the district denied the grievance. The position taken in the grievance is consistent with the position in this proceeding. Finally, even if the purported concession did represent the association’s original position, there is no evidence that the district was misled or somehow detrimentally relied on the position. The district did not change its position at all. The association is not judicially estopped from pursuing this unfair labor practice charge.

**D. Remedy**

Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-406(4) provides that when the Board finds that an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice, the Board shall order the employer to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Collective Bargaining Act. Thus the appropriate remedy for the district’s failure to bargain in good faith is an injunction against making unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment, a return to the *status quo ante*, an order to bargain should the district seek additional reassignments, and a posting requirement.
A return to the status quo ante requires that the district immediately assign the four teachers who are the subject of this case to the assignments they had in the 2003-2004 school year and to bargain with the association if the district seeks to change their assignments.

In its request for relief, the association also requested an order requiring the district to reimburse employees for any lost pay and benefits resulting from the unfair labor practice. There is no evidence that any employee lost pay or benefits as a result of the reassignments. However, individual employees of the district are entitled to have any leave used to participate in the hearing of this matter reinstated.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


2. A public employer may not refuse to bargain collectively in good faith on questions of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment with an exclusive representative of its employees. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-31-305 and 39-31-401(5). An employer that makes unilateral changes during the course of a collective bargaining relationship concerning wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment has refused to bargain in good faith. NLRB v. Katz (1962), 369 U.S. 736.

3. For purposes of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(5), the assignments of incumbent employees are conditions of employment, and constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. A public employer cannot unilaterally change the assignments of incumbent employees without bargaining with the exclusive representative of those employees.

5. By unilaterally and involuntarily reassigning incumbent members of its teaching staff without bargaining, the Bonner School District No. 14 violated Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(1) and (5).\(^5\)

6. The Bonner Education Association did not waive its right to bargain the issue of assignments of its members.

7. The Bonner Education Association's charge is not moot.

8. The Bonner Education Association is not judicially estopped from pursuing its charge.

9. As a result of the unfair labor practice committed by the Bonner School District No. 14, the Bonner Education Association is entitled to cease and desist orders, a return to the status quo ante, an order to make the members of the Bonner Education Association whole for their losses resulting from the unfair labor practice by reinstating any leave used to participate in the hearing of this matter, and an order to post and publish the notice set forth in Appendix A.

VI. RECOMMENDED ORDER

Bonner School District No. 14 is hereby ORDERED:

1. To immediately cease the practice of unilaterally altering terms and conditions of employment without bargaining with the Bonner Education Association, and in particular to cease the practice of unilaterally and involuntarily reassigning incumbent employees; and

2. Within 30 days of this order:

   a. To return Mary Ann Strothman, Erin Roberts, Julie Hasler Foley, and Jilyn Chandler to the positions they held during the 2003-2004 school year;

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\(^5\)The district contended it had done nothing to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 39-31-201.” However, as noted supra, a violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(5) is also considered a “derivative” violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(1). The complainant has made no contention suggesting an independent violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-401(1) (as opposed to a derivative violation) occurred in this case.
b. To bargain with the Bonner Education Association about any future involuntary reassignments of incumbent members of the district's teaching staff;

c. To reinstate all leave taken by members of the Bonner Education Association to participate in these proceedings;

d. To post copies of the notice contained in Appendix A at conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, at Bonner school for a period of 60 days while school is in session and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.

DATED this __th day of May, 2005.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By: Anne L. MacIntyre, Chief
    Hearings Bureau
    Department of Labor and Industry

NOTICE: Pursuant to Admin. R. Mont. 24.26.215, the above RECOMMENDED ORDER shall become the Final Order of this Board unless written exceptions are postmarked no later than June 3, 2005. This time period includes the 20 days provided for in Admin. R. Mont. 24.26.215, and the additional 3 days mandated by Rule 6(e), M.R.Civ.P., as service of this Order is by mail.

The notice of appeal shall consist of a written appeal of the decision of the hearing officer which sets forth the specific errors of the hearing officer and the issues to be raised on appeal. Notice of appeal must be mailed to:

Board of Personnel Appeals
Department of Labor and Industry
P.O. Box 6518
Helena, MT 59624-6518
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing document were, this day, served upon the parties or their attorneys of record by depositing them in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Debra A. Silk, General Counsel
Montana School Boards Association
One South Montana Avenue
Helena, MT 59601

Karl I. Englund
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 8358
Missoula, MT 59807

DATED this 11th day of May, 2005.

Sandy Duncan
APPENDIX A

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals has found that Bonner School District No. 14 violated the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.

We will not fail to bargain in good faith with the Bonner Education Association, MEA/MFT;

We will not unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment of employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement with Bonner Education Association MEA/MFT;

We will return Mary Ann Strothman, Erin Roberts, Julie Hasler Foley, and Jilyn Chandler to the positions they held during the 2003-2004 school year;

We will bargain with the Bonner Education Association, MEA/MFT, about any future involuntary reassignments of incumbent members of the district's teaching staff;

We will reinstate all leave taken by members of the Bonner Education Association, MEA/MFT to participate in the hearing of ULP Case No. 32-2004.

DATED this ___ day of June, 2005.

BONNER SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 14

By: ________________________________
STATE OF MONTANA
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS


BONNER EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA-MFT, NEA, AFT, AFL-CIO, Complainant,

- vs -

BONNER SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 14, Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came before the Board of Personnel Appeals (Board) on September 22, 2005. The matter was before the Board for consideration of the Notice of Exceptions to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order filed by Debra A. Silk, attorney for Defendant, to the Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law; and Recommended Order issued by Anne L. MacIntyre, Chief, Hearings Bureau, dated May 11, 2005.

Debra A. Silk, attorney for the Defendant, and Karl J. Englund, attorney for the Complainant, appeared in person.

1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Notice of Exceptions to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is hereby dismissed.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law; and Recommended Order is hereby affirmed.

DATED this 3rd day of October, 2005.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By: Jack Holstrom
Presiding Officer

Board members Holstrom, Reardon and Audet concur.
Board member Johnson dissents.
NOTICE: You are entitled to Judicial Review of this Order. Judicial Review may be obtained by filing a petition for Judicial Review with the District Court no later than thirty (30) days from the service of this Order. Judicial Review is pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-4-701, et seq., MCA.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Debra Silk, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed to the following on the 5th day of October, 2005:

DEBRA A. SILK
MONTANA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION
ONE SOUTH MONTANA AVENUE
HELENA MT 59601

KARL J. ENGLUND
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 8358
MISSOULA MT 59807-8358
This is a petition for judicial review of a final order of the Montana Board of Personnel Appeals. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, which have been submitted on the briefs.

The Bonner Education Association (hereinafter Association) filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging the Bonner School District (hereinafter School District) had unilaterally changed working conditions when it unilaterally transferred or reassigned certain teachers. An administrative hearing was conducted in December 2004 by Hearings Officer Anne MacIntyre, who, in May 2005, issued findings,
conclusions and a recommended order in which she found that the School District had unilaterally and involuntarily reassigned teachers without bargaining with the Association, in violation of the collective bargaining law. The School District appealed her decision to the Board of Personnel Appeals (hereinafter Board), which subsequently upheld the decision.

In filing cross motions for summary judgment, the parties acknowledge, and the Court agrees, that there are no factual disputes involved in this petition. The sole issue is a legal one: whether the school district was required to enter into collective bargaining before attempting to transfer teachers.

The standard for reviewing an administrative agency's conclusions of law is whether the agency's interpretation of the law is correct. Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 P.2d 601, 603 (1990); Baldridge v. Rosebud County Sch. Dist. 19, 264 Mont. 199, 205, 870 P.2d 711, 714 (1994). Thus, this Court's task is to determine whether the Board correctly decided that the School District wrongly transferred the teachers without bargaining.

Various statutes pertain to the issue in this petition. Section 39-31-201, MCA, gives public employees the power to bargain collectively "on questions of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment . . . ." Section 39-31-305(2), MCA, requires public employers to bargain reasonably and in good faith "with respect to wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment . . . ."

Section 39-31-303, MCA, sets forth management rights of public employers. It provides in pertinent part:

Public employees and their representatives shall recognize the prerogatives of public employers to operate and manage their affairs in such areas as, but not limited to:
(2) hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees; . . .

The hearing examiner indicated in her discussion that since transfer of employees is a condition of their employment, the two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, and she therefore proceeded to apply a balancing test obtained from other jurisdictions.

The rules of statutory construction require a statute to be construed according to the plain meaning of the language therein. *State ex rel. Woodahl v. Dist. Ct.*, 162 Mont. 283, 511 P.2d 318 (1973). When the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court to construe. *Hammill v. Young*, 168 Mont. 81, 85-86, 540 P.2d 971, 974 (1975). In addition, statutes relating to the same subject matter must be construed together and be harmonized whenever possible. *In re W.J.H.*, 226 Mont. 479, 736 P.2d 484 (1987). Finally, when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former, so a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. Section 1-2-102, MCA.

The Court finds no difficulty in interpreting the statutes above harmoniously. They are neither ambiguous nor irreconcilably in conflict. Section 39-31-303, MCA, expressly reserves to management the right to transfer public employees. Other conditions of employment, excluding the ones listed in Section 39-31-303, MCA, are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under Section 39-31-305(2), MCA. Thus, the School District was not required to bargain collectively with respect to the transfer of the teachers.

The question as to whether the unilateral transfer of the teachers violated the collective bargaining agreement is answered in the management rights clause of the
agreement:

The Association recognizes the prerogatives of the Board to operate and manage the school district and retain, without limitation, all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it by law, except as limited by explicit terms of this agreement.

The agreement contains no express provision for bargaining teacher transfers. Thus, the management rights clause of the agreement is controlled by Section 39-31-303, MCA. It should be noted that the Montana Supreme Court has recognized the broad managerial powers conferred on school districts by statute. *Savage Educ. Ass’n v. Trustees of Richland County Elem. Dist. # 7, 214 Mont. 289, 294, 692 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1984).*

The next issue raised in the petition is whether the union waived its right to bargain over the teacher transfers. Since this Court has ruled that the teacher transfers were within the management rights of the School District, it is not necessary to address this issue.

Finally, the Association argued before the hearing examiner that the School District was required to bargain teacher transfers because it had a long standing past practice of not unilaterally transferring teachers. The hearing examiner declined to address this issue, calling it ultimately irrelevant. This Court, therefore, determines that the hearing examiner should address this issue upon remand.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that summary judgment is GRANTED and DENIED in accordance with this decision. The matter is REMANDED to the hearing examiner to proceed in accordance with this decision.

DATED this 11th day of August, 2006

[Signature]
DOROTHY McCARTER
District Court Judge

pcs: Tony C. Koenig/Debra A. Silk
Karl J. Englund
Board of Personnel Appeals

RECEIVED
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Standards Bureau
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2008 MT 9

BONNER SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 14,

Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

BONNER EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
MEA-MFT, NEA, AFT, AFL-CIO,

Respondents and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADV-2005-719
Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellants:
Karl J. Englund (argued), Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee:
Debra A. Silk (argued) and Tony C. Koenig, Montana School Boards Association, Helena, Montana

Argued and Submitted: September 5, 2007
Decided: January 15, 2008

Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The Bonner Education Association (BEA) appeals from an order of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, granting the Bonner School District No. 14’s (District) motion for summary judgment. We reverse.

BEA presents the following issues for review:

Whether the District Court properly determined that teacher transfers and assignments are not mandatory subjects of bargaining under Montana’s Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act.

Whether the District Court properly determined that the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement protected the District from an unfair labor practice claim when it transferred teachers without bargaining.

Whether the District Court properly remanded to the Hearings Officer the question of whether a long-standing practice should be treated as an express provision of a collective bargaining agreement.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The District hired a new superintendent, Doug Ardiana (Ardiana), between the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years. Ardiana and BEA president Julie Foley (Foley) met to discuss Ardiana’s administrative plans before the start of the 2003-2004 school year. Ardiana informed Foley that he had reassigned teachers in other school districts in which he had worked, and that he would consider doing so in Bonner as he thought necessary to meet the needs of the District. The District involuntarily transferred and reassigned several teachers at Ardiana’s direction during the 2003-2004 school year.
The transfers and reassignments affected the subjects taught and the teachers’ areas of expertise. The District had not involuntarily transferred or reassigned teachers within the previous ten years. BEA responded on April 14, 2004, by filing an unfair labor practice claim with the Board of Personnel Appeals (Board). BEA alleged that the District improperly had refused to bargain for the transfers and reassignments. BEA alleged that the District violated §§ 39-31-401 and 39-31-305(2) MCA, by refusing to bargain in good faith with respect to a condition of employment.

BEA and the District were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) at the time. The term of the CBA ran from July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2004. The CBA did not specifically provide procedures for teacher transfers and reassignments. The CBA did include a management rights clause that recognized the School Board’s prerogative to manage the school district, “except as limited by explicit terms of [the CBA].”

The Board conducted a hearing to determine whether Montana law or the terms of the CBA required the District to bargain in good faith for the transfers. The Board considered both the explicit statutory management right to “hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees . . . ,” provided in § 39-31-303(2), MCA, and the statutory duty to bargain in good faith for conditions of employment, provided in § 39-31-305(2), MCA. The Board determined that involuntary teacher transfers constituted mandatory subjects of bargaining as conditions of employment and as conditions that “can have a great impact on the well-being of an individual teacher,” citing its own decision in Florence-Carlton Unit v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 15-6 (1979), ULP 5-77.
¶10 The Board also considered whether the CBA allowed the District to make involuntary teacher transfers and reassignments. The District asserted that the CBA’s management rights clause provided express authorization. The clause recognized the School Board’s “prerogative[...] to operate and manage the school district and retain, without limitation, all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it by law. [...]” The District claimed that this portion of the CBA expressly incorporated the statutory management rights set forth in § 39-31-303(2), MCA.

¶11 The Board rejected this interpretation of the CBA. The Board concluded that such a broad interpretation of management rights necessarily would defeat other express provisions of the CBA regarding teacher choice in staffing and hiring decisions. Moreover, the Board found the CBA to be ambiguous as to the parties’ intent to incorporate the statutory management right. The Board also concluded that a teacher’s right to continue teaching a subject or a grade represented a “professional advantage” explicitly preserved and protected under the CBA.

¶12 The Board finally determined that the CBA’s integration clause and the management rights clause did not constitute a waiver of BEA’s right to bargain for transfers and reassignments. The Board applied a federal interpretative scheme that considered the parties’ past bargaining history and the absence of an express waiver of BEA’s right in the CBA. The Board determined that the parties past bargaining practice of not addressing transfers and reassignments and the absence of an express waiver preserved BEA’s right to bargain for transfers and reassignments in the CBA. The Board therefore concluded that the
District committed an unfair labor practice when it transferred or reassigned teachers without bargaining with BEA.

¶13 The District petitioned the District Court for judicial review. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court determined that the statutory management right contained in § 39-31-303, MCA, expressly reserved to the District the right to transfer or assign involuntarily as evidenced by management's “prerogative[]...[to] hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees...” The District Court concluded that only “other working” conditions not expressly listed under § 39-31-303, MCA, represented mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

¶14 The District Court also determined that the CBA's management rights clause and the statutory management right authorized the District to transfer and assign unilaterally absent an express provision requiring bargaining for teacher transfers. The District Court declined to consider whether BEA had waived its right to bargain for transfers and assignments in light of its decision that the transfers and assignments fell within the District's management rights. Finally, the District Court remanded to the hearing examiner the question of whether the District's long-standing practice of not making unilateral transfers without bargaining should be treated as though it constituted an express term of the CBA. BEA appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 A district court reviews an administrative agency's findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
in the whole record. A district court will uphold an agency’s conclusion of law if the agency’s interpretation of the law is correct. We in turn employ the same standards when reviewing a district court’s decision. Roos v. Kircher Public School Bd., 2004 MT 48, ¶ 7, 320 Mont. 128, ¶ 7, 86 P.3d 39, ¶ 7. The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement provision presents a question of law that this Court reviews to determine if it is correct. Hughes v. Blankenship, 266 Mont. 150, 154, 879 P.2d 685, 687 (1994).

DISCUSSION

¶16 Whether the District Court properly determined that teacher transfers and assignments are not mandatory subjects of bargaining under Montana’s Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act.

¶17 Section 39-31-305(2), MCA, obligates a public employer to bargain “in good faith with respect to wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment . . . .” This mandate is virtually identical to the collective bargaining mandate in title 29, section 158(d) of the United States Code, a section of the federal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 158(d) provides that the parties must negotiate “in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). An employer commits an unfair labor practice under § 39-31-401(5), MCA, if it refuses to negotiate in good faith on any of these subjects. Neither the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act, nor the NLRA defines “other conditions of employment.” We have not had the opportunity yet to examine the scope of “other conditions of employment.”
¶18 This Court has looked previously to federal courts' construction of the NLRA as an aid to interpretation of the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act. *Small v. McRae*, 200 Mont 497, 502, 651 P.2d 982, 985 (1982) (citing *State, Dept of Hiys. v. Public Employees Craft Coun.*, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974). The similarity between § 39-31-305(2), MCA, and 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), and the fact that we have not yet explored the scope of "other conditions of employment," leads us to look to these federal decisions for instruction.

¶19 The U.S. Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have construed conditions of employment broadly for purposes of the collective bargaining mandate. For example, the Court in *Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB*, 379 U.S. 203, 209-16, 85 S. Ct. 398, 402-05 (1964), stated that the policy of fostering "industrial peace" represents a primary consideration when classifying a bargaining subject as a condition of employment under the NLRA. Similarly, the Court in *Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB*, 441 U.S. 488, 495, 99 S. Ct. 1842, 1848 (1979), pronounced that the courts must show deference to the NLRB's classifications of bargaining subjects as conditions of employment. In *Ford Motor Co.*, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the setting of food prices for in-plant meals for employees constituted a condition of employment, it described conditions of employment as matters "plainly germane to the working environment," and "not among those managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." *Ford Motor Co.*, 441 U.S. at 498, 99 S. ct. at 1850 (citing *Fibreboard Corp.*, 379 U.S. at 222-23, 85 S. Ct. at 409) (internal quotation marks omitted). Managerial decisions that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control," as distinguished from conditions of employment, include those things related to the
“basic scope of the enterprise. . . .” *Fibreboard Corp.*, 379 U.S. at 223, 85 S. Ct. at 409 (Stewart, J. concurring).

¶20 The federal courts and the NLRB have determined that a diverse range of issues qualify as conditions of employment, and thus constitute mandatory bargaining subjects. The NLRB in *Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville*, 330 NLRB 900, 902-03 (2000), held that telephone access, break policies, and accounting for product shortfalls qualify as conditions of employment under the NLRA. Free agency and reserve issues in professional baseball constitute conditions of employment under the NLRA. *Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Comm.*, 67 F.3d 1054, 1060-62 (2d Cir. 1995). Rental rates for company houses also represent conditions of employment under the NLRA. *American Smelting and Refining Co. v. NLRB*, 406 F.2d 552, 553-55 (9th Cir. 1969).

¶21 The federal courts and the NLRB, in early cases interpreting the scope of the NLRA, specifically have held that employee transfers constitute conditions of employment that must be bargained under the NLRA. In *Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB*, 126 F.2d 452, 457-60 (7th Cir. 1942), the court determined that transferring employees from department to department constituted a condition of employment that required collective bargaining. The NLRB held in *In re U.S. Automatic Corp.*, 57 NLRB 124, 133-35 (1944), that even transfers of non-union employees presented proper subjects of mandatory collective bargaining. And in *Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB*, 170 F.2d 247, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1948), the court determined that a related bargaining subject, seniority, posed a mandatory bargaining subject because requiring negotiation provides “protection of employees against arbitrary management conduct in connection with hire, promotion, demotion, *transfer* and discharge . . . .” (emphasis added).
¶22 We agree with those early federal NLRA decisions that employee transfers and reassignments, like those at issue in this case, constitute conditions of employment. The teacher transfers in Bonner were "plainly germane to the working environment," perhaps more plainly so than the in-plant meal prices for employees in Ford Motor Co. Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 498, 99 S. Ct. at 1850. The involuntarily transferred Bonner teachers experienced changes in the subjects they were expected to teach, the number of subjects they were expected to teach, and the abilities and special needs of the students they were expected to teach. The Board recognized the importance of a teacher's particular assignment. The Board noted the expertise that teachers acquire over years of teaching the same subject, the supplies and materials pertinent to each subject (sometimes purchased with their own funds), and the value of the continuing education unique to their particular subject or grade level.

¶23 The teacher transfers did not concern the "basic scope of the enterprise," and thus did not lie "at the core of entrepreneurial control." Fibreboard Corp., 379 U.S. at 223, 85 S. Ct. at 409. The transfers did not concern the subjects being taught at the school. The transfers concerned who would teach those subjects. The transfers did not concern which grades were taught at the school. The transfers concerned who would teach those grades. The scope of the school's enterprise remained the same — educating students in grades kindergarten through eight. The conditions changed under which its employees were expected to work.

¶24 We hold that teacher transfers and reassignments constitute "other conditions of employment" as contemplated by § 39-31-305(2), MCA. This interpretation comports with the policy goals pronounced by the legislature in enacting the collective bargaining statutes. Section 39-31-101, MCA, articulates that the overarching policy behind the Collective
Bargaining for Public Employees Act encourages “the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and the employees.” This policy mirrors the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Fibreboard*, in which it held that fostering “industrial peace” must be a primary consideration in determining whether an issue constitutes a condition of employment under the NLRA. *Fibreboard Corp.*, 379 U.S. at 209-15, 85 S. Ct. at 402-06.

¶25 The District points out that the NLRA lacks a management rights provision that corresponds to § 39-31-303, MCA. The District argues that this omission precludes us from analogizing to federal law concerning topics deemed to be conditions of employment and therefore subject to mandatory collective bargaining. The Montana management rights provision recognizes, in pertinent part, the “prerogatives of public employers to operate and manage their affairs in such areas as, but not limited to . . . hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees.” Section 39-31-303(2), MCA. BEA acknowledges this distinction between Montana and federal law, but asserts nevertheless that federal court and NLRB decisions should guide our decision in light of the fact the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an implicit and inherent right to manage existing in the NLRA.

¶26 BEA cites *First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB*, 452 U.S. 666, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981), as an example of the broad management rights recognized by federal courts. The Court held that management retains the right under the NLRA to manage “free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business.” *First National Maintenance*, 452 U.S. at 678-79, 101 S. Ct. at 2580-81. The Court concluded that the “employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking” empowered
the employer to discharge a number of its employees without bargaining, notwithstanding the statutory duty. *First National Maintenance*, 452 U.S. at 679, 101 S. Ct. 2581.

¶27 A comparison of the implicit federal management right recognized by the federal courts with the explicit management right provided in § 39-31-303(2), MCA, reveals the undefined federal right to be more expansive. The federal management right contains no defined scope or outer limit. The federal courts nevertheless have determined that employers have a duty to bargain for employee transfers under the NLRA. *Rapid Roller Co.*, 126 F.2d at 457-60; *In re U.S. Automatic Corp.*, 57 NLRB at 133-35; *Inland Steel Co.*, 170 F.2d 252-53. The Montana management rights provision, on the other hand, discusses a “prerogative” rather than a “right,” and defines the particular subjects to which it applies.

¶28 The District urges us to rely on federal authority interpreting management rights clauses in collective bargaining agreements that employ language similar to the language in § 39-31-303, MCA. The District contends that those cases consistently have determined that management rights clauses permit employers to exercise expressly reserved rights without first bargaining. The District argues that *Uforma/Shelby Business Forms, Inc. v. NLRB*, 111 F.3d 1284, 1290 (6th Cir. 1997), and *NLRB v. U.S. Postal Service*, 8 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1993), should guide our decision. The District’s reliance on *Uforma* and *U.S. Postal Service* falls short.

¶29 *Uforma* involved a waiver by the union. The union’s express waiver of its right to bargain collectively by agreeing to “clear and unmistakable” language in the collective bargaining agreement sustained the *Uforma* court’s conclusion. *Uforma*, 111 F.3d at 1290. The Court in *U.S. Postal Service* decided the case primarily on the basis of whether the union
had lost its right to bargain for a subject by previously agreeing to its inclusion in the management rights clause of a collective bargaining agreement. *U.S. Postal Service*, 8 F.3d at 836-38. The current controversy involves no similar bargaining or express waiver of rights.

¶30 Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction, the statutory management rights provision does not absolve public employers from their duty to bargain for employee transfers. The management rights provision refers to management’s “prerogative[]” to “hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees.” Section 39-31-303(2), MCA. Both BEA and the District urge that we interpret “prerogative” according to the plain dictionary meaning of the term. Both rely on substantially similar definitions of prerogative as “an exclusive or special right, power or privilege.”

¶31 The District contends that an exclusive right, power, or privilege means an unlimited right with regard to the subjects listed in the management rights provision regardless of the duty to bargain under § 39-31-305, MCA. The District argues that the provision absolves it of a duty to bargain for all subjects listed. BEA counters that the prerogative means the exclusive right to make a final decision in the matter. BEA points out that this right to decide remains intact whether the statute requires the employer to bargain. BEA asserts that a bargaining mandate only obligates the employer to meet with the employees’ representative and negotiate in good faith. The statute mandates the process. It requires management to concede nothing. We agree.

¶32 Such an interpretation avoids unnecessary conflict between the two statutes. It also serves both the practical necessity for management rights and the stated purpose of the
Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act “to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and their employees.” Section 39-31-101, MCA. In light of our determination that § 39-31-305(2), MCA, requires the District to bargain regarding teacher transfers, we hold that the District Court improperly determined that the District was not required to bargain for teacher transfers and reassignments under the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act.

¶33 Whether the District Court properly determined that the management-rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement between the District and BEA protected the District from an unfair labor practice claim when it transferred teachers without bargaining.

¶34 The rules of contract construction guide us in determining whether the CBA permitted the District to transfer teachers without bargaining. See e.g. Kuhr v. City of Billings, 2007 MT 201, ¶ 18, 338 Mont. 402, ¶ 18, 168 P.3d 615, ¶ 18. We long have recognized, however, the importance of promoting “the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and their employees.” Small, 200 Mont. at 502, 651 P.2d at 987 (citing § 39-31-101, MCA). This same policy animates federal labor law. This Court previously has looked to federal courts for guidance in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. Small, 200 Mont. at 502, 651 P.2d at 985. “[R]efusals to confer and negotiate had been one of the most prolific causes of industrial strife” before the advent of modern labor principles. Fibreboard Corp., 379 U.S. at 211, 85 S. Ct. at 403. This overarching policy goal also guides our consideration of the CBA.
¶35 The District argues that the CBA’s management rights provision explicitly provides the District with authority to make unilateral teacher transfers without bargaining. This provision, Article IV, § 4.1 of the CBA, provides as follows:

[BEA] recognizes the prerogatives of the [District] to operate and manage the school district and retain, without limitation all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon and vested in it by law, except as limited by explicit terms of this agreement.

The District contends that the prerogatives recognized in this provision necessarily must include the right to transfer because it is not “limited by explicit terms” elsewhere in the CBA. The District further argues that the provision will be rendered meaningless unless we interpret the provision in this way. The District contends that our failure to apply this interpretation would violate the rule of contract construction that provides that “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together so as to give effect to every part if reasonably practicable ....” Section 28-3-202, MCA.

¶36 Reading the CBA as a whole, however, reveals that two other clauses figure prominently. The CBA contains an integration clause, commonly known as a “zipper clause,” that provides that the parties have subsumed all agreements into the CBA. *International Union v. Murata Erie North America*, 980 F.2d 889, 903 (3rd Cir. 1992). A union that agrees to a zipper clause generally waives its right to bargain for otherwise mandatory subjects of bargaining that might not be included in the agreement. *International Union*, 980 F.2d at 903.

¶37 The zipper clause provides:

[The CBA constitutes] the full and complete [a]greement between the [District] and the BEA. The provisions herein relating to salary, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment supersede any and all prior agreements, resolutions, practices, rules or regulations concerning salary, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment inconsistent with these provisions.

The clause, read in isolation, could be interpreted to waive BEA’s statutory right to bargain for teacher transfers and assignments as terms and conditions of employment. *International Union, 980 F.2d at 903.* We do not read a particular clause in isolation, however, as we must interpret the CBA as a whole. Section 28-3-202, MCA.

¶38 The CBA also contains a professional advantages clause. The clause provides that the CBA “shall not be interpreted to deprive teachers of professional advantages heretofore enjoyed, however, this does not incorporate these advantages into this contract.” The Board determined that “the ability to continue to teach in a subject or grade of a member’s choice” constitutes a professional advantage protected under that clause. We have not yet had an opportunity to interpret the scope of a professional advantages clause. Other jurisdictions have interpreted a professional advantages clause as a condition that would “increase [a teacher’s] employability” in his field, and a condition that would “aid [a teacher] in getting and retaining subsequent employment in [the] teaching profession.” E.g. *Westbrook Sch. v. Westbrook Tchrs. Ass’n,* 404 A.2d 204, 212 (Me. 1979).

¶39 We must interpret the CBA in a manner that “give[s] effect to every part if reasonably practicable . . .” Section 28-3-202, MCA. We noted above that transfers and reassignments constitute conditions of employment, in part, because of the expertise teachers acquire over years of teaching the same subject, and the value of the continuing education unique to their particular subject or grade level. ¶22. Expertise and education represent conditions that
could increase employability or aid “in getting and retaining subsequent employment in the teaching profession.” *Westbrook Sch.*, 404 A.2d at 212. The CBA’s professional advantages clause could be interpreted to protect teachers from involuntary teacher transfers and reassignments.

¶40 The zipper clause and the professional advantages clause in the CBA present us with conflicting provisions. The zipper clause has the general effect of waiving mandatory bargaining subjects not specifically contained in the CBA. In particular, it supersedes past practices concerning conditions of employment. The District had not transferred or reassigned teachers for the past ten years. ¶7. The zipper clause could be interpreted to waive BEA’s right to bargain for teacher transfers or reassignments. The CBA simultaneously protected teachers from unilateral changes to conditions that concerned professional advantages. The expertise and education acquired over years of teaching the same subject could be interpreted to constitute a protected professional advantage.

¶41 The CBA, read as a whole, does not reveal conclusively whether the zipper clause waived BEA’s right to bargain for teacher transfers. Likewise, the CBA does not reveal whether the professional advantages clause specifically protected teachers from unilateral transfers or reassignments. The CBA’s conflicting provisions lend themselves to more than one meaning. The CBA is ambiguous as a matter of law. See *Mary J. Baker Revoc. Trust v. Cenex Harvest*, 2007 MT 159, ¶¶ 20-21, 338 Mont. 41, ¶¶ 20-21, 164 P.3d 851, ¶¶ 20-21.

¶42 Section 39-31-305(1), MCA, provides that it is the duty of a public employer to bargain in good faith. The statutory duty to bargain includes a duty to bargain as to “any question arising” under the CBA. Section 39-31-305(1), MCA. Ambiguity in the zipper
clause and the professional advantages clause constitutes a “question arising” under the CBA. The CBA provides no clear mechanism to resolve the correct interpretation of those competing provisions. Section 39-31-401(5), MCA, provides that it is an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively in good faith.

¶43 The District overstates the concern that to require collective bargaining for teacher transfers would defeat its expressly reserved management right under the CBA. To require collective bargaining on a subject, in fact, has no effect on the employer’s fundamental right to manage and operate. Collective bargaining does not impose on management the duty to concede to union demands. Collective bargaining merely means, under Montana law, “to meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith . . . .” Section 39-31-305(2), MCA. It obligates the employer to no particular outcome. It merely obligates the employer to participate in good faith in the actual collective bargaining process.

¶44 We note that bargaining also promotes the purpose of the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act to “remove[] certain recognized sources of strife and unrest” and “arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and their employees.” Section 39-31-101, MCA. Similarly, Congress, in its statement of policy goals for the NLRA, emphasized that “[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 151. Collective bargaining provides a process that places little actual burden on the employer, but can do so much to “defuse[] and channel[] conflict between labor and management.” First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 674, 101 S. Ct. at 2578. We determine that the District
committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain in good faith for teacher transfers and assignments, in light of the ambiguity in the CBA created by the competing provisions of the zipper clause and the professional advantages clause.

¶45 Whether the District Court properly remanded to the Hearings Officer the question of whether a long-standing practice should be treated as an express provision of a collective bargaining agreement.

¶46 BEA argues on appeal that the District Court improperly remanded to the Hearings Officer the issue of whether the District’s long-standing practice of not unilaterally transferring teachers required it to bargain for teacher transfers. We need not address this issue because we have held that both the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act and the CBA require the District to bargain.

¶47 Reversed.

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE